Moral Bars to Intellectual Property: Theory & Apologetics by Snow, Ned
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
2021 
Moral Bars to Intellectual Property: Theory & Apologetics 
Ned Snow 
University of South Carolina - Columbia, snownt@law.sc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ned Snow, Moral Bars to Intellectual Property: Theory & Apologetics , 28 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 75 (2021). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact 
dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
75




Various intellectual creations are raising complex moral issues in intellec-
tual property law.  Videos of mass shootings made by perpetrators, statues of 
the Confederacy displayed openly, torture techniques used on criminal detain-
ees, and devices for consuming illegal drugs are only a few examples.  These 
expressive and inventive works pose the question of whether their apparent 
immoral nature should preclude intellectual property protection.  Although 
courts and scholars have long debated moral values in intellectual property 
doctrines, the literature is largely silent on the effect of intellectual property 
theory.  The question thus arises: Do the utilitarian, labor-desert, and autonomy 
theories of intellectual property imply that morality is relevant to whether a 
work should receive patent or copyright protection?  This is a critical question 
left unanswered by the scholarship and jurisprudence dealing with intellectual 
property and morality.  This Article considers the question.
This Article posits that each theory of intellectual property suggests 
that moral values should inform whether intellectual works receive protec-
tion.  The Article then contemplates likely objections, responding to arguments 
that academics have raised against the position that moral values should define 
intellectual property.  Specifically, it responds to the argument that denying 
protection in some instances may increase the output of an immoral work, that 
laws in areas other than intellectual property should address moral problems, 
and that the government should not interfere with the laissez-faire approach of 
letting the public decide the moral worth of an intellectual creation.  The Arti-
cle concludes that, within constitutional limitations, certain moral values may 
serve as reasons to deny intellectual property protection.
© 2021 Ned Snow.  All rights reserved.
* Ray Taylor Fair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.  The author thanks Jake 
Linford for his valuable comments on a prior draft.  Comments from participants of 
the 2021 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium further helped shape the 
arguments herein.
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Last year, a young man filmed himself carrying out a deadly shooting 
spree that killed fifty-one Muslim worshipers in a half-hour’s time.1  Should 
the immorality of his atrocious actions preclude him from holding a copyright 
in his video creation?  In recent years, methods of physical and psychological 
1. See, e.g., Graham Macklin, The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral 
Video Age, CTC Sentinel 18–19 (July 2019), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf [https://perma.cc/65YD-L5GE] (“[T]he 
central point of his attack was not just to kill Muslims, ‘but to make a video of someone 
killing Muslims.’  [The perpetrator] visually choreographed his attack, filming the atroc-
ity using a GoPro camera, which gave the footage the quality of a first-person ‘shoot 
‘em up.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jason Burke, Opinion, Technology Is Terrorism’s 
Most Effective Ally.  It Delivers a Global Audience, Guardian (Mar. 17, 2019), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/17/technology-is-terrorisms-most- 
effective-ally-it-delivers-a-global-audience [https://perma.cc/AX3J-QVQ6])).
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torture have been developed for use on criminal detainees.2  Should the immo-
rality of torture preclude patent protection for those methods?
As various creative works increasingly raise such moral questions, 
this issue of whether morality should affect intellectual property protection 
demands consideration.  Although scholars have discussed specific moral 
values that should inform intellectual property eligibility,3 few have considered 
intellectual property theories as part of that analysis.4  The literature has been 
surprisingly silent.  The question thus arises: Do the theories of intellectual 
property imply that morality is relevant to whether the law should recognize 
patent or copyright protection?  This Article is the first to consider this ques-
tion.  It argues that the utilitarian, labor-desert, and autonomy theories of 
intellectual property each imply specific moral values in evaluating the eligibil-
ity of works.  In setting forth this position, this Article also contemplates likely 
objections, including theoretical arguments that academics have raised against 
the application of moral values in defining intellectual property.  This Article 
responds to those arguments, filling a critical void in the scholarly discussion 
about the role of morality in intellectual property.
Importantly, the discussion of this Article is limited in nature.  It does not 
purport to consider all systems of morality, nor does it argue for the adoption 
of a specific moral system arising independent of intellectual property.  Rather, 
this Article is limited to the moral values that are implied by the three most 
common theories which underlie patent and copyright law—not trademark 
and trade secret law.  This Article argues that these theories imply moral values 
that are relevant to defining the copyright and patent eligibility of works and 
defends that conclusion against potential objections.
The starting point for this discussion is an examination of the three 
theories of intellectual property, as set forth in Part I.  First, the utilitarian 
incentive theory posits that intellectual property exists to provide an eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate expressive and inventive works. 
This theory implies the moral value that the law should not incentivize works 
that result in a net cost to society.  The utilitarian theory’s economic rationale 
further suggests that denying intellectual property protection is appropri-
ate where the market for an intellectual work fails to account for a negative 
2. See Mark P. Denbeaux, Stevie Moreno Haire, & Tatiana Laing et al., How America 
Tortures (Dec. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3494533 [https://perma.cc/5Q8N-8GE3].
3. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1 (2012); Margo 
A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 
45 Wm. & Mary L.  Rev. 469 (2003).
4. Robert Merges has written a strong defense of intellectual property. Robert P. Merg-
es, Justifying Intellectual Property (2011).  He provides a rich discussion of phil-
osophical foundations and principles that guide the decision of whether to recognize 
intellectual property.  His writing, however, does not specifically address whether the 
theoretical justifications contemplate moral values dictating a denial of protection.
78 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 28:75
externality or asymmetric information.  Second, the labor-desert theory 
posits that intellectual property exists to reward a creator for her labor or 
investment in creating the work.  This theory is premised on the moral value 
that the law should not reward creators whose intellectual works harm life, 
health, liberty, or property of another, or society generally.  Third, the theory 
of autonomy and personality posits that intellectual property exists to rec-
ognize a creator’s individuality that is present in creative works.  This theory 
implies the moral value that the law should not recognize rights in works that 
inhibit another’s autonomy or exercise of personality.  Taken together, these 
three theories provide justification for denying intellectual property protec-
tion to certain types of works.
Having reached this conclusion, the Article considers three specific the-
oretical arguments that are cited as reasons not to deny protection on moral 
grounds.  The first argument is that denying protection in many instances may 
actually increase the output of the specific immoral work.  This Article explains, 
however, that under any of the intellectual property theories, a denial of pro-
tection is not supposed to control or solve a moral problem that is inherent in 
a work.  Dealing with that problem is the role of other areas of the law.  The 
purpose of denying intellectual property protection is simply to refrain from 
incentivizing or rewarding immoral activity.  The denial of protection has noth-
ing to do with controlling or curbing such activity.
The second argument is that other laws, not intellectual property, should 
address the moral problems associated with a work.  This Article responds that 
other laws should indeed be the means for resolving the moral problem.  To 
that end, intellectual property should support these other laws by not incen-
tivizing or rewarding the very behavior that the other laws attempt to control. 
Moreover, intellectual property comprises violable rights, which are sufficiently 
flexible in nature such that they may be affected by moral considerations—
regardless of whether other laws address the specific moral problems.
The third argument is that the government should not interfere with the 
laissez-faire market approach of letting the public decide the moral worth of 
an intellectual creation.  This Article responds by acknowledging the merits of 
this approach.  In many, if not most, situations, the free market should decide 
the moral worth of a work.  However, this presumption should not represent an 
absolute bar that would preclude Congress, or in rare circumstances the courts, 
from denying protection for moral reasons.  Just as the government must inter-
vene in limited circumstances to address market failures in other laissez-faire 
marketplaces, the market for intellectual creations is no different.  The gov-
ernment should act within the marketplace based on an assessment of market 
failures.  Within certain constitutional limitations set forth in the Intellectual 
Property Clause and First Amendment, denial of protection may be appropri-
ate in the laissez-faire market.
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This Article thus proceeds in two Parts.  Part I sets forth the three theo-
ries of intellectual property and argues that each implies a specific moral value 
that limits the scope of protection.  Part II responds to arguments against the 
conclusion that moral criteria should inform the scope of intellectual property.
I. Moral Limitations in Intellectual Property Theories
Before addressing the issue of morality within intellectual property, it 
is necessary to establish the meaning of morality.  Morality may be defined 
to mean a code of conduct that dictates what a person ought or ought not to 
do.5  For instance, the proposition that stealing is wrong represents a moral 
judgment: people ought not to steal.  Morality therefore dictates whether an 
action is right or wrong; it prescribes the actions that people should and should 
not choose.6
With this understanding of morality, this Article considers issue of 
whether morality should play a role in defining intellectual property.  The 
moral values considered in this Article are those implied by three established 
theories of intellectual property: utilitarian (incentivizing beneficial effects 
for society); labor-desert (rewarding the creator’s labor); and personality-au-
tonomy (recognizing the creator’s autonomy and personality in a work).7  In 
the Subpart below, this Article observes that each theory recognizes a spe-
cific moral value to justify intellectual property rights and also suggests certain 
moral limitations on intellectual property protection.
A. Utilitarian
Utilitarianism posits that people should act in a way that maximizes util-
ity.  John Stuart Mill propounded the general moral theory of utilitarianism, 
writing: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse 
of happiness.”8  Fundamentally, this utilitarian rationale invokes a moral prin-
ciple—specifically, the principle that the consequences of an action define 
whether the action is moral.9  If an act promotes utility, it ought to be pursued.
5. See Bernard Gert & Joshua Gert, The Definition of Morality, Stan. Encyc. Phil. (Feb. 
8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/morality-definition [https://
perma.cc/KH73-WBYK].
6. See id.
7. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal and 
Political Theory of Property 168, 169–73 (Stephen R.  Munzer ed., 2001).  Fisher pro-
poses a fourth theory—social planning.  See id.  I do not discuss that theory herein.
8. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 6 (T.N.R. Rogers ed., Dover Publ’ns 2012) (1863).
9. See id.; see also Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, Stan. Encyc. Phil. (June 
3, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/consequentialism [https://
perma.cc/UCC4-3MCE].
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This simple moral principle underlies the utilitarian theory of intellectual 
property.  Essentially, the utilitarian theory of intellectual property is based 
on the moral view that the consequences of recognizing intellectual property 
protection yield greater utility for society than the consequences of not recog-
nizing intellectual property protection.  Society is better off with intellectual 
property laws because of the utility they provide.
Several questions follow from this moral principle.  First, as a theoretical 
matter, how does extending intellectual property protection yield greater util-
ity for society?  Second, are there exceptional situations in which the utilitarian 
rationale does not suggest extending intellectual property protection?  Third, if 
such an exceptional situation does arise, what practical considerations should 
guide the denial?  These questions are discussed in the three Subparts below.
1. Incentive for Production
Utilitarian theory justifies intellectual property rights as a necessary 
means for bringing about a useful result for society.  Under this theory, intellec-
tual creations are “public goods.”10  A public good is a product that is available 
to anyone (non-exclusive) and has a supply that does not decrease when a 
person consumes it (non-rivalrous).  Owing to these characteristics, creators 
of these goods cannot bar “free riders” from consuming the goods.  Thus, left 
to natural market forces, the goods will be underproduced in relation to public 
demand.  The underproduction of intellectual creations is a failure of the 
free market.
Intellectual property law represents the government’s intervention into 
the free market to resolve the problem of the market’s underproduction of 
certain types of intellectual creations.  The government provides creators with 
intellectual property rights to exclude others from committing specific uses 
of their creations.  In this way, intellectual property rights provide creators 
with a monopoly over uses of their creations, and that monopoly facilitates an 
economic incentive for them to produce and disseminate their creations for 
public consumption.11  More specifically, inventors and authors can charge a 
10. See generally William M.  Landes & Richard A.  Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 13–14, 19 (2003) (defining and discussing public goods in 
intellectual property).
11. The necessity of the incentive function of copyright has been called into question by 
several scholars.  See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did 
We Just Imagine That?, 12 Theoretical Inquiries L.  29, 29 (2011) (“[T]he empirical 
foundation for the copyright-as-incentive story is seriously suspect.  It fails to account 
for the economic conditions under which most art, literature and other expressive 
works are produced, and it contravenes the insights provided over the last forty years 
or so by psychologists interested in creativity and by behavioral economists.”); Lydia 
Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright?  Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative 
Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 La.  L.  Rev.  1, 3 (2008) (“[T]he law 
should take creator and distributor motivation into account in determining how robust 
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fee for others to make certain uses of their patented inventions or copyrighted 
expressions.  That fee allows creators to recover the investment costs that were 
necessary to create the invention or expression.  Hence, intellectual prop-
erty rights represent the government intervening in the free marketplace to 
incentivize the production of otherwise underproduced intellectual creations. 
Utilitarian theory, then, is essentially a theory based on economic incentives to 
bring about a useful outcome for society.
2. Moral Limitations
In some instances, the utilitarian justification for intellectual property 
is lacking.  To the extent that an intellectual work lacks sufficient beneficial 
effects to compensate for the costs that the work imposes on society, utilitarian 
theory suggests that the law should not encourage the creation.  For exam-
ple, developing a method for torturing humans does not appear to provide a 
net benefit for society.  The harmful consequences that might follow from this 
invention suggest that the invention imposes a cost on society greater than any 
benefit that it might provide.  Under this circumstance, the utilitarian theory 
suggests against granting patent protection for the invention.  Hence, the util-
itarian theory implies a simple limitation on the scope of protection: creations 
that impose a net cost on society ought not to be encouraged by extending 
protection.  The law should not intervene by extending intellectual property 
protection where the creation is harmful to society.
This moral limitation has problems in application.  It is difficult to assess 
whether a creation is, in fact, harmful to society.  Consider a tabloid newspaper 
that knowingly publishes a falsehood, purporting that the false story is true. 
Some people are certain to gain utility from the tall tale, perhaps because it 
supports their belief system or simply serves as entertainment.  Although those 
people wrongly believe that the story is true, they are not made any worse off 
by holding a false belief that does not affect their actions or property rights. 
The entertainment value to readers might outweigh any reputational harm to 
the person subjected to the defamatory content.  Similarly, consider the inven-
tion of cigarettes, which are highly destructive to human health.  Some people 
value the utility from consuming cigarettes more than the cost that they impose 
on their health.  Is the cigarette invention harmful to society?  Perhaps not, 
given that a significant portion of the population values the immediate utility 
from cigarette consumption more than the longterm cost of smoking.  The util-
ity calculus depends on whose viewpoint is considered and, as a result, harm 
can be difficult to establish.
Related to the above argument, it is often difficult to identify which 
values are relevant in assessing societal harm.  Does the value of preserving 
the copyright protection afforded should be.”); David A. Simon, Culture, Creativity, & 
Copyright, 29 Cardozo Arts & Ent.  L.J.  279, 281 (2011) (“[A]uthors may not always 
create copyrightable works for remuneration.”).
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environmental resources matter when assessing harm?  Opinions vary on 
whether human behavior that negatively affects environmental resources is in 
fact a harm to society.  For some, negative environmental effects may be out-
weighed by societal economic gain.  Similarly, is the value of economic gain 
more important than educational achievement?  Than the individual mortal-
ity rate?  Than leisure time?  Many value judgments must be made to assess 
whether a creation affecting various aspects of life promises a net benefit 
or cost to society.  Yet in explaining utilitarianism, Mill simply defines harm 
generically as pain.12  The incentive theory discussed previously does not define 
which values matter, as it concerns overcoming an economic failure in the 
marketplace for intellectual works.  Hence, uncertainties inherent in assess-
ing whether a creation is harmful to society present a significant challenge to 
applying the moral value of utilitarianism.
Although these uncertainties are inherent in assessing harm, they do 
not affect application of the moral limitation under the incentive theory.  That 
theory provides a basis for measuring harm.  Recall that the incentive theory 
justifies intellectual property rights on the ground that intellectual creations 
are public goods that the market underproduces.  A market failure, caused by 
the public-good nature of the creation, justifies government intervention in the 
market for intellectual creations.  This means, then, that the incentive theory 
defines harm according to market failure—that is, where the market fails to 
produce an optimal level of the creation.  Harm may thus be defined as exist-
ing where circumstances result in the market failing to provide an efficient 
level of production of a work.  Harm is not one person’s subjective opinion 
about moral values.  It is an inefficient level of production in the marketplace 
for the work.
Under this definition of harm, it is possible to identify other circum-
stances that may result in a market failure.  Unlike the circumstance of a public 
good, other circumstances may result in an overproduction of intellectual cre-
ations, namely, the circumstances of asymmetric information and negative 
externalities.13  Asymmetric information arises when consumers and producers 
of a good do not have the same information about the good and that informa-
tion affects the decision to purchase or sell.14  Suppose that an inventor knows 
that a side effect of his useful invention is likely to cause health problems for 
the consumer in the future, but individual consumers do not know this fact.  In 
this situation, demand for the invention will be higher than the optimal level 
because of asymmetric information—consumers will want more of the prod-
12. Mill, supra note 8, at 6 (“By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”).
13. See Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 Ind. L.J. 1473, 1512–13 (2015).
14. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489–92 (1970) (discussing the effect of asymmet-
ric information in the free market system).
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uct than they would have had they known about the potential negative health 
consequences.  Similarly, a negative externality occurs where a third party to 
a transaction incurs a cost.15  Suppose that an inventor creates and sells an 
invention that pollutes the environment.  Members of the public are negatively 
affected by the invention, even though they themselves are not direct consum-
ers in the transaction.16  The cost is diffused to the public instead of remaining 
concentrated with the individual consumers, so the cost is not accurately felt by 
the individual consumers, causing demand to be higher than the optimal level 
for society.17
The presence of these circumstances thus results in an overproduction of 
intellectual creations.  This simple fact suggests that the justification for inter-
vening in the marketplace to grant intellectual property may be lacking.  Recall 
that incentive theory provides a reason to justify government intervention in 
the marketplace for intellectual creations—namely, their underproduction. 
Yet where other circumstances are present that indicate an overproduction 
of certain intellectual creations, those other circumstances indicate a different 
market failure than the original failure which justified intervention in the first 
place.  Indeed, those other circumstances may be sufficiently grave that the 
overproduction is likely to be great.  For instance, in the previous polluting-in-
vention example, if the negative externality of pollution is sufficiently costly 
to the third parties (say, completely eliminating the earth’s ozone layer), that 
market failure would cancel the original justification for granting intellectual 
property protection in the first place (specifically, its public-good nature).  In 
such instances, the justification for granting protection would be inadequate.18
15. See Anne Steinemann, Microeconomics for Public Decisions 191 (3d ed. 2018).
16. See Peter T. Wendel, Protecting Newly Discovered Antiquities: Thinking Outside the “Fee 
Simple” Box, 76 Fordham L.  Rev. 1015, 1032–33 (2007) (describing market failures that 
would result from pollution); cf. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global 
Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 
Cornell L.  Rev.  1101, 1175 (1988) (“[A]ll consumers were not necessarily free to 
choose safe or safer cars, nor were they adequately informed to make a correct choice. 
Congress thus rejected arguments that the market alone would provide the level of 
automobile safety that Congress now sought to ensure.”).
17. See Wendel, supra note 16, at 1032–33.
18. This argument draws support from observations by Brett Frischmann and Mark Lem-
ley about “spillover” effects of intellectual property.  See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark 
A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257 (2007).  In their landmark article, they 
observed that the traditional justification for intellectual property rights is that an in-
tellectual creation yields spillover effects for society (or in other words, it yields pos-
itive externalities).  See id. at 284–85.  For example, a new drug that can cure ailing 
patients yields positive externalities which are not usually present in the absence of 
patent rights: the patients will both be cured and contribute productive outcomes to so-
ciety.  Yet, as Frischmann and Lemley explained, this justification does not always hold 
true: the cost of propertizing a creation could result in market distortions that are det-
rimental to social welfare.  Id. at 299.  In the example just cited, strong property rights 
in the drug might hinder an optimal level of dissemination or impede the production of 
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Thus, the problems that arise in applying the moral limitation of harmful 
consequences may be resolved by the identification of a negative externality 
or asymmetric information.  The circumstances may indicate a market failure 
resulting in the overproduction of a work, which diminishes the argument for 
extending intellectual property protection.  This is not to say, however, that 
in every instance of a negative externality or asymmetric information the 
law should deny intellectual property protection.  Some market failures that 
result from these circumstances may be minimal.  Consider again the pollut-
ing machine.  If the machine emits a pollution level that is very minimal, the 
effect on third parties may be negligible, such that the externality would not be 
sufficiently problematic to undermine the argument to grant protection.  The 
presence of only a slight market failure would not imply that granting protec-
tion would result in a net harm for society, so a slight market failure would not 
imply that protection should be denied.  Hence, other circumstances that chal-
lenge protection must cause a level of overproduction that is at least as great as 
the level of underproduction caused by the public-good circumstance.  In the 
pollution example, the harmful effects of the pollution on third parties must 
result in an overproduction of the machines at least equal to the underproduc-
tion of the machines that results from their invention being a public good.  The 
upshot is that market failures implying a denial of protection must be suffi-
ciently severe to deny protection.  This requirement, of course, raises a question 
of practical application.  That question, along with others, are discussed next.
3. Practical Issues
The moral limitation of the utilitarian theory raises some practical issues. 
First, for a denial to be justified, must the denial alleviate the circumstance of 
asymmetric information or a negative externality?  Second, must the severity 
of the market failure caused by that circumstance be well established?  Third, 
which government actor should make the assessments that would justify the 
denial?  These issues are discussed below.
other productive drugs that are only remotely similar to the original.  Hence, intellectu-
al property law should not simply assume that the presence of a positive externality that 
follows from an intellectual creation justifies incentivizing it through property rights.
 The spillover argument supports my argument for two reasons.  First, it relies on the 
premise that a creation’s ultimate effect on society should determine whether a creation 
should be propertized.  The fact that an intellectual property right might increase the 
output of a creation does not imply that extending it protection is necessarily good for 
society.  Second, the spillover argument implies that market distortions caused by nega-
tive externalities that follow from a creation may be reason not to protect the creation. 
See Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 801, 806–07 (2009) (“[T]oo few (many) resources may be allocated to activities 
that generate positive (negative) externalities because those persons deciding whether 
and how to allocate resources fail to account for the full range of benefits (costs).” (em-
phasis added)).
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a. Fixing Other Failures
The first question deals with whether a denial of intellectual property 
protection must necessarily resolve the market failure that called into question 
the original basis for granting intellectual property protection.  For instance, if 
a work causes a negative externality, is denial of patent protection appropriate 
only if the denial will cure that negative externality?  The answer is no.  The 
denial of protection does not represent an attempt to cure the market failure. 
Rather, the denial represents a choice not to cure the original market failure 
(namely, the underproduction of the public good).  The presence of a market 
failure that would overproduce the creation simply undercuts the original jus-
tification for granting protection in the first place.  In the pollution example, 
denying protection for the polluting machine is not intended to fix the problem 
of pollution.  Indeed, it is not intended to bring about any result.  The denial 
simply reflects a choice not to intervene.  Likewise, denying protection for a 
defamatory news story is not supposed to alleviate the effects of the defam-
atory publication.  Rather, it reflects a choice not to support that content.  In 
short, denial of protection is not intended to remedy the market failures that 
suggest an overproduction of intellectual creations.  The denial reflects the law 
leaving the parties as it finds them.  Rather than incentivizing the harmful cre-
ation, intellectual property law should do nothing.  Thus, the purpose of denial 
is not to cure the market failure.
Of course, other legal means might be employed to correct the market 
failure.  Perhaps a tax, a disclosure requirement, a tort action, or a criminal 
penalty would resolve the negative externality or asymmetrical information. 
Denial of intellectual property is not supposed to replace these other legal 
means for curing market failures.  Moreover, if such other means were effective 
at curing market failures, intellectual property protection could yet be justified. 
For instance, a tax on a specific invention that polluted might both decrease 
demand for the invention (decreasing the aggregate pollution level) and gen-
erate sufficient funds to remedy environmental damage.  In this situation, it 
might make sense to grant patent protection for the polluting invention.  More 
generally, other legal means may be employed in conjunction with intellectual 
property protection in order to produce an optimal level of production.  Other 
legal means may cure the market failures so that beneficial consequences may 
yet be realized for society through extending intellectual property.  However, 
until those other legal means can cure the market failures, intellectual property 
protection should be denied.
b. Assessing the Severity of Other Failures
As discussed above, market failures that challenge the argument for 
granting intellectual property protection must be sufficiently severe to deny 
protection.  Recall that market failures resulting from negative externalities 
or asymmetric information must cause a level of overproduction that is at 
least as great as the level of underproduction caused by the market failure 
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resulting from the public-good nature of the work.  How does one establish 
this fact?  Admittedly, this question poses evidentiary difficulties.  It is diffi-
cult to precisely identify the amount that the market underproduces of an 
intellectual work as a result of that work being a public good.  Likewise, it is 
difficult to identify the amount that the market overproduces of an intellec-
tual work specifically because the work causes a particular negative externality 
or asymmetric information.  These sorts of inquiries require assessing market 
responses under hypothetical conditions that are difficult to model.  Therefore, 
the inquiry would likely lead to guesswork.
The difficulty surrounding such inquiries does not imply that the inqui-
ries are not worth considering.  The point of weighing the market failure that 
calls for recognizing intellectual property (owing to the public-good nature of 
a work) against an offsetting market failure (owing to negative externalities or 
asymmetric information) is to ensure that not every instance of an offsetting 
market failure will lead to a denial of protection.  Some of the other offset-
ting market failures may simply not be sufficiently detrimental or established 
in fact to result in a denial of protection.  Accordingly, the severity of an off-
setting market failure should be considered, but not necessarily empirically 
proven, in deciding whether to withhold protection.  Even in the absence of 
empirical evidence, the question of severity is still worth considering as a the-
oretical and intuitive matter.  Asking the question ensures that denials are not 
commonplace.
With this in mind, consider purposefully deceitful expression in a news-
paper.  The circumstance that would suggest against recognizing intellectual 
property protection is asymmetric information: the creators of the content 
realize the falsity of the newspaper story, whereas the consuming public may 
not.  If, however, such expression were to occur in a tabloid newspaper, con-
sumers might not actually believe the deceitful assertions, for the public has 
come to expect falsehoods in tabloids.  This fact suggests that the potential 
market failure from asymmetric information is likely minimal, so there is not 
likely an overproduction of the work.  At the same time, tabloid newspapers 
likely rely on the copyright incentive to create their work, for their stories seem 
creative and unusual; the copyright ensures that other tabloids do not copy the 
creativity of the original tabloid’s stories.  This means that without copyright 
protection, there would be a great underproduction of work.  Taken together, 
the potential overproduction from the asymmetric information in the tabloid’s 
story appears to be less than the potential underproduction from the tabloid’s 
public-good nature.  Copyright should not be denied.
Now consider the same situation of deceitful expression, but on a major 
news network that presents itself as providing news that is fair and balanced. 
In this situation, viewers would expect accurate information, so viewers likely 
would not read or watch that news if they knew that the information was pur-
posefully inaccurate.  There would be a clear overproduction of the “fake news” 
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story resulting from the asymmetric information.  At the same time, the copy-
right on the news story seems to be only minimally effective in incentivizing its 
creation.  The lack of an effective incentive is because the facts in a news sto-
ries are not protected under a copyright—only the expression is—which means 
that the copyright in the news story is necessarily thin.19  Hence, copyright plays 
little role in incentivizing the creation of pure news stories.  This implies that 
the public-good nature of news stories would not likely cause an excessive 
underproduction of those stories—at least not any less than with copyright 
protection.  In short, the potential overproduction from the asymmetric infor-
mation in fake news appears more than the potential underproduction from 
the news’s public-good nature.  Copyright should be denied.
c. Choosing the Government Actor
The moral limitation that depends on the existence of another market 
failure calls for evidence of those other failures.  Denial of protection requires 
more than theoretical possibilities of other market failures.  This leads to the 
third issue: Which government actor should make the determination that 
another market failure justifies denial of protection?  Given the intensively 
fact-based inquiry, courts are not likely competent to make those judgments. 
Such factfinding processes should usually be performed by the branches of 
government best equipped to engage in that process—the legislative or exec-
utive branch.  Those branches represent the government institutions charged 
with deciding policy based on factual findings, so they should work together 
to arrive at a conclusion.  The point is that the government actor that makes 
the denial must be equipped to engage in the sort of factual inquiries that 
reveal other market failures for intellectual creations.  Courts are not usu-
ally that actor.
This conclusion, though, does not mean that courts can never identify 
market failures.  There are some instances where market failures may be so 
obvious that a court’s equitable and constitutional obligations require courts 
to deny protection.20  However, these instances are relatively rare, and in most 
situations the legislative or executive branches should make these determi-
nations.  These branches are politically accountable, so if they were to deny 
protection for reasons other than actual market failures, their decisions may 
be reversed.  More must be said on this point in considering the doctrine that 
would govern application of the denial.21  For now,  it is enough to note that 
19. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344, 348 (1991) (recogniz-
ing that “facts are not copyrightable” but that if an “author clothes facts with an orig-
inal collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written 
expression”).
20. See Ned Snow, Copyright, Pornography, and Unclean Hands, 72 Baylor L.  Rev.  (forth-
coming 2021).
21. See Ned Snow, Intellectual Property and Immorality: Against Protecting Harmful Cre-
ations of the Mind (Apr. 9, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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determining which actors are responsible for identifying other market failures 
is an important practical consideration in implementing the moral limitation 
of utilitarian theory.
In sum, the utilitarian theory implies a moral limitation: actions with 
harmful consequences should not be encouraged through the economic incen-
tive of intellectual property rights.  The economic framework of utilitarian 
theory suggests that the harmful consequences are manifest through a market 
failure.  A market failure may result from negative externalities or asymmetric 
information.  Those circumstances suggest an overproduction of works, which 
cancels the market-failure justification for extending intellectual property, 
namely, that the public-good characteristic of an intellectual work will result 
in an underproduction of works.  The presence of either circumstance, which 
leads to an offsetting market failure, suggests that the government should not 
extend protection to those creations.
B. Labor-Desert
As articulated by John Locke, the labor-desert theory (or “labor 
theory,” for short) posits that property rights derive from a person mixing his 
labor with a thing so that the person severs that thing from the wilderness.22 
Locke explained:
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every 
man has a “property” in his own “person.”  This nobody has any right to but 
himself.  The “labour” of his body, and the “work” of his hands, we may say, 
are properly his.  Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature 
hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It being by him 
removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men.23
Here, Locke relies on self-evident premises that a person has a property 
right in himself, his labor, and the work of his hands.  Based on these premises, 
Locke reasons that if a person works to remove a thing from the state of nature 
(which no one has owned previously), the person must have a property right in 
that thing as well.  Locke thus grounds property rights in the moral view that 
a person deserves property rights because of the labor that he has invested in 
removing something from nature.24
Applying this simple rationale to intellectual property is straightforward.25 
A person who has labored to create something with her intellect deserves to 
22. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Govern-




25. For explanations of Lockean theory applied to intellectual property, see Merges, supra 
note 4, at 35–48; and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 
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have property rights in that creation.  The wilderness from which she severs her 
creation is the public domain from which creators draw material.26  Because 
of the investment that a creator makes in taking public-domain materials and 
putting their effort into works, so as to sever them from the public domain, cre-
ators deserve property rights in those creations.
The labor theory of intellectual property is based on moral premises that 
imply a significant role for morality in defining intellectual property rights. 
Yet the labor theory is often ignored,27  and seems less influential in devel-
oping intellectual property rules than the utilitarian theory.  As discussed in 
Subpart I.B.1, however, the labor theory is integral to the claim of rights hold-
ers over their intellectual creations.  Although not as widely recognized as the 
utilitarian theory, the labor theory still fundamentally underlies claims to intel-
lectual property.  Based on this conclusion, Subpart I.B.2 examines the moral 
premises on which labor theory relies, and how those premises relate to intel-
lectual property.
1. Complement to Utilitarian Theory
Does labor theory accurately describe a reason for the existence of intel-
lectual property rights?  The answer to this question informs whether the moral 
values inherent in labor theory should define the rights.  The argument against 
labor theory as an explanation for intellectual property rights and the response 
to this argument are addressed below.
a. The Argument Against Labor Theory
As a practical matter, the labor theory is much less influential than the 
utilitarian theory in the legal reasoning of judges and commentators who 
consider intellectual property.28  To begin with, the Constitution specifies a util-
itarian purpose that underlies Congress’s power to legislate both copyright and 
patent laws.  Specifically, the Intellectual Property Clause states: “The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”29  According to the clause, pro-
moting the progress of science and useful arts is the purpose of intellectual 
property laws, and that purpose exists to benefit society.  The collective public 
benefit of promoting the progress of science and useful arts is unmistakably 
287, 296–330 (1988).
26. See Merges, supra note 4, at 39–41.
27. See discussion infra Subpart II.A.1 (explaining reason for ignoring labor theory).
28. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 169–70, 173 (observing primacy of utilitarian theory 
over labor theory); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353–57 (1991) 
(rejecting Lockean sweat-of-the-brow argument as basis for copyright protection).
29. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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focused on a utilitarian end.30  There is no mention of any labor-desert ratio-
nale in the Constitution.31
In patent law specifically, the prevalence of utilitarian influence over 
labor-desert is undeniable.  Mark Lemley and Dan Burk have observed that, 
especially in the context of patent law, theories that are based on moral right of 
labor-desert “are hard to take seriously as explanations for the actual scope of 
patent law.”32  They explain:
The short term of patent protection, the broad right to prevent independent 
development of an idea, and the control patent law can give over products 
never built or contemplated by the patent owner are all difficult to square 
with the idea that a patentee “deserves” to own the rights granted by the law.  
We grant patents in order to promote innovation, and so we should grant 
patents only to the extent necessary to encourage such innovation.33
This assertion by Lemley and Burk is undeniable: empirical observa-
tions about why inventors seek patent protection strongly suggest a utilitarian 
explanation.34
In copyright law, the Supreme Court has explicitly repudiated the 
labor-desert rationale.  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service 
Co., the Court considered whether factual information in a telephone directory 
could receive copyright protection.35  Holding that facts could not receive pro-
tection, the Court explained: “[T]he 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave 
no doubt that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright 
protection in directories and other fact-based works.”36  Feist makes clear that 
the labor that an author expends in creating a factual work does not necessar-
ily imply copyright protection.37
30. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (recognizing purpose of copyright 
law as creating a societal system that will promote the progress of science); Graham v. 
John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (explaining social-welfare purpose 
of patent law).
31. See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 841, 850 (1993) (“The Constitution makes it 
clear that intellectual property rights are limited rights subordinated to a social purpose, 
and the point is reinforced in both judicial doctrine and legislative history.”).  Waldron 
provides insightful criticism against a Lockean theory of intellectual property.  See id. at 
851–52.
32. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev.  1575, 
1597 (2003).
33. Id. at 1597–99 (footnotes omitted).
34. Cf.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1024–30 (1989) (explaining utilitarian justifi-
cations for patent rights under the Constitution).
35. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342–43 (1991).
36. Id.  at 359–60.
37. Id.
2021] MORAL BARS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91
b. The Argument for Labor Theory
Given the argument against labor theory, should Locke’s justification 
for intellectual property be filed away as a mere theoretical exercise without 
practical import?  Hardly so.38  Without the moral justification for the individ-
ual’s claim, property rights would be based entirely on what benefits society 
as a whole.  And what benefits the whole is not necessarily consistent with the 
moral claim of an individual.  Consider the argument that property rights gen-
erally should be based on the societal utility for which individuals promise to 
use the subject matter of the rights—be it land, a physical object, or an intel-
lectual creation.39  Under this argument, whoever promises to put the land, 
the object, or the creation to the most beneficial use according to society’s 
interest would receive the property rights.  The individual’s moral claim to a 
creation would not matter.  Consider also the argument that intellectual prop-
erty rights should not exist at all.  There is some support for this argument: in 
the absence of intellectual property, market forces would still incentivize inno-
vation and creativity (just in a different way and perhaps to a different degree); 
the monopolies of intellectual property impose collective costs on society that 
arguably outweigh their marginal benefits.40  As previously noted, this argu-
ment has some strength under utilitarian theory.
Most would agree, though, that creators should have some sort of rights 
over their works—not necessarily because society would be better off, but out 
of fairness to the individual creator.41  Fairness to the individual does not reflect 
utilitarian reasoning, but rather, the fairness rationale reflects the labor theory. 
Labor theory is based on the moral claim of an individual to her creations.  It 
implies that the moral bases of natural law and fairness require a property right 
38. For a well-reasoned response to criticisms against Lockean theories applied to intellec-
tual property, see Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 155 
(2002).
39. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 350 
(1967) (“If the main allocative function of property rights is the internalization of ben-
eficial and harmful effects, then the emergence of property rights can be understood 
best by their association with the emergence of new or different beneficial and harmful 
effects.”).
40. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 Fla. St. U. 
L. Rev. 623, 624 (2012) (questioning copyright’s assumption that external incentives 
are necessary); cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 515 (2009) (“[T]he desire to create can be 
excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic incentive . . . .  [A] 
copyright law that treats creativity as a product of economic incentives can miss the 
mark and harm what it aims to promote.”).
41. For a discussion on utility and fairness in relation to property, see Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compen-
sation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).  For arguments in support of recognizing 
property as a keystone right, consistent with Locke’s labor theory, see Carol M. Rose, 
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329 (1996).
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in the fruit of an individual’s creative acts.  This is not to say that utilitarian 
explanations for intellectual property are unsound or not influential.  Indeed, 
labor theory complements the utilitarian theory insofar as the utilitarian theory 
has the effect of validating moral claims of the individual.  But where utilitar-
ian theory might fail to recognize the claim of an individual, the labor theory 
gives reason to still recognize it.  So even though Locke’s labor theory may not 
have value as an explanatory theory for why individuals create certain works 
(especially in the patent context), the theory is still valuable to provide a moral 
basis for an individual’s claim to property rights in a creative work.
This understanding that utilitarian theory works in conjunction with 
labor-desert theory is consistent with the Intellectual Property Clause.  As 
stated above, the clause adopts a utilitarian rationale to justify copyright and 
patent laws: the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts.  Yet that 
utilitarian rationale does not suggest a rejection of Locke’s moral theory.42  The 
clause merely provides Congress a power to effectuate an instrumental end 
without suggesting whether an individual may hold a moral claim to intellec-
tual property.  To be sure, the clause is entirely silent on the question of an 
individual moral claim to intellectual property rights.  And that makes sense. 
The clause arises in the context of setting forth powers of Congress—not indi-
vidual rights or claims.  Indeed, not until the Bill of Rights did the Constitution 
address individual rights.  It would be highly irregular for the original Consti-
tution (without the Bill of Rights) to even suggest the individual’s moral claim 
for a right, especially in the context of setting forth a congressional power. 
Hence, labor theory is consistent with the Intellectual Property Clause’s utili-
tarian rationale.
Although the clause is silent on the question of whether an individual has 
a moral claim to a creation, colonial statutes of the time do speak to this issue. 
Those statutes explicitly apply Locke’s moral view to intellectual property.  The 
language of the 1783 Massachusetts Copyright Act, which several other colo-
nies adopted, provides an example of this.  It states:
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the 
public weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness, 
greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the var-
ious arts and sciences: As the principal encouragement such persons can 
have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the 
legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and 
as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no prop-
erty more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labour 
of his mind:
42. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal Protection 
of Intellectual Property, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 1105, 1119 (2012) (observing that the In-
tellectual Property Clause provides a legal justification for Congress passing intellectual 
property laws, but not a moral justification).
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 Therefore, to encourage learned and ingenious persons to write useful 
books for the benefit of mankind:
 Be it enacted  .  .  .  [t]hat all books, treatises, and other literary 
works . . . shall be the sole property of the said . . . authors . . . .43
While the statute recognizes the societal benefits of intellectual property 
rights, it also recognizes that such property rights in intellectual creations are 
“one of the natural rights of all men,” because intellectual creations are “pro-
duced by the labour” of the mind.44  Hence, the statute employs both utilitarian 
and labor-desert rationales to justify the intellectual property.
Similar to the Intellectual Property Clause, the cited statements by the 
Supreme Court in Feist do not mean that the labor theory is irrelevant to copy-
right law.45  The import of its statements is that an author’s labor cannot replace 
the requirement that expression be original.  That does not imply that labor 
does not give rise to an individual’s moral claim to property rights.  Indeed, 
the Court has recognized that the public’s interest in recognizing intellectual 
property law supports the individual’s claim under a labor-desert rationale.  In 
Mazer v. Stein, the Court explained:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’  Sacrificial days 
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the 
services rendered.46
Hence, at the same time that the clause implies an economic utilitarian 
end, the Court recognized that “creative activities deserve rewards.”47  The 
presence of labor theory in intellectual property could not be more explicit.
The upshot is that the prevalence of the utilitarian theory as a support-
ing rationale for intellectual property does not imply that the labor-desert 
theory is not also relevant.  Locke’s theory addresses the individual moral 
43. Copyright Off., Copyright Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States Since 
1783 Relating to Copyright 4 (1973) (emphasis added and omitted).  Other colonial 
copyright statutes adopted similar language: the statutes of New Hampshire and Rhode 
Island contained language that was nearly verbatim to the Massachusetts statute quot-
ed above, see id. at 8, 9; the statutes of Connecticut, Georgia, and New York contained 
language indicating that “principles of natural equity and justice” call for copyright laws, 
id. at 1, 17, 19; the statute of North Carolina stated that “nothing is more strictly a man’s 
own than the fruit of his study,” id. at 15.  For further observations about state copyright 
statutes, see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion 
of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771, 
1807–09 (2006).
44. Copyright Off., supra note 43, at 4.
45. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–61 (1991).
46. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
47. Id.
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justification, whereas the utilitarian theory addresses the collective moral jus-
tification of society.  Both justifications serve as bases to recognize intellectual 
property rights.
2. Moral Limitations
Having discussed the relevancy of the labor theory for intellectual prop-
erty, this Article now considers certain moral values that underlie that theory. 
Although Locke does not state these moral values in his explanation of the 
labor theory, he states them in another part of the same treatise, and their 
application to that theory is unmistakable.
a. Moral Premises of Labor Theory
Locke premises his labor-desert theory on two moral values that limit 
his theory.48  The first moral value is that everyone ought not to harm anyone 
else.  This value derives from Locke’s premise that God holds a property right 
in everyone and that God’s property right in everyone implies that everyone 
must “shar[e] all in one community of Nature.”49  Because everyone must share 
in one community, men have no authority “to destroy one another,” and “[e]
very one . . . ought [to do] as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, 
and not . . . take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the 
life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”50  Locke explains this natu-
ral-law principle as follows: “[N]o one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty or possessions.”51
The issue that follows is whether this general moral value represents a 
limitation on Locke’s labor-desert theory.  Recall that the labor theory relies 
on the premise that a person holds a property right in himself.52  At the same 
time, Locke also recognizes that everyone is the property of God.53  Given 
that God created people, God’s interest in a person would appear superior to 
the person’s own interest in himself.  This implies that the labor theory, which 
follows from holding a property interest in oneself, must be subject to the nat-
ural-law principle of not harming another, which follows from everyone being 
the property of God.  More specifically, if a person were to labor to remove 
something from the wilderness, and if his labor involves harming someone else 
in her life, health, liberty, or possession of something, that person would not 
48. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1544–45, 1560–62 (1993) 
(explaining Locke’s “no-harm principle” as it relates to property law and noting that “[i]
f the property claim itself would do harm, it cannot be enforced without raising addi-
tional problems of justification”).
49. Locke, supra note 22, § 6, at 120.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 119.
52. Id. § 27, at 130.
53. Id. § 6, at 119–20.
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deserve property rights in the thing that he removed from the wilderness.  His 
moral claim to property would be barred by the moral value that no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.
Locke recounts a second moral value that limits behavior which he 
describes as “the first and fundamental natural law.”54  The moral value is that 
everyone must act for “the preservation of the society and (as far as consis-
tent with the public good) of every person in it.”55  This is so fundamental, 
Locke argues, that it “should govern even the legislat[ure]” itself.56  As first and 
fundamental relative to all other natural laws, this moral value must limit the 
labor-desert theory.  Preservation of society and its members is the most funda-
mental tenet of natural law.  This moral value thus implies, once again, that if a 
person’s labor to remove something from the wilderness involves him acting in 
a way that is detrimental to the preservation of society (or a person in society), 
that person would not deserve property rights in the thing removed.
Thus, the two moral values that underlie the labor theory lead to the 
same practical conclusion: individuals should not harm others in working to 
create the subject of property rights, and efforts that result in harm to society 
or its members should not be rewarded with property.
b. Application to Intellectual Property
These moral values that limit Locke’s labor theory imply complementary 
limitations for intellectual property rights.  They imply that if creating an intel-
lectual work would harm others in their life, health, liberty, or possessions, or 
prove detrimental to the preservation of society, the creator would not deserve 
intellectual property rights.  The general principle remains that harmful actions 
disqualify the actor from receiving property recognition.
This general moral limitation on intellectual property is distinct from the 
moral limitation in utilitarian theory.  The most obvious difference is that the 
labor theory defines harm according to subject matters—life, health, liberty, 
possessions, and the preservation of society.  Although these subject matters 
certainly entail a broad scope of creations, they do not merely rely on market 
failures to define harm.  The market might correctly value some creations, but if 
the creation effectuates harm to one of these subject matters, the moral limita-
tion of labor theory would suggest against recognizing property rights.  Unlike 
utilitarian theory, market preferences and market failures are simply not rele-
vant to defining harm under the moral principle that limits labor theory.
The labor theory is also distinct in that it recognizes a moral objection 
to harming individuals.  Even if a creation on balance is beneficial for soci-
ety, harmful effects to one individual warrant against granting protection. 
For instance, methods of torture as an effective means for gaining truthful 
54. Id. § 134, at 183.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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information might be beneficial to society at large, but the cost of human 
health and life to a single individual would suggest against recognizing patent 
protection for the torture method.  Even assuming that the market fully inter-
nalizes the cost to the individual tortured, such that no market failure would 
exist in the price of the invention, that fact would not matter under the moral 
limitation of labor theory.  So, as distinct from the market-failure limitation 
under utilitarian theory, the moral limitation under labor theory would not 
recognize protection because of harm to the individual.  Labor theory does not 
view the absence of any market failures as implying an absence of any disqual-
ifying harmful consequences.
Of course, the moral limitation on labor theory is a general one.  It leaves 
open many questions.  How much harm must occur before denying intellectual 
property protection?  Must the intellectual creation directly cause the harm? 
Must the harm follow from the act of creation, from the subject matter of cre-
ation, or from the exercise of rights?  Locke does not provide any answer to 
these questions.  The questions must therefore be addressed in discussing the 
specific doctrines that serve to apply the general principle.  For instance, the 
equitable power of courts may allow for judicial denial of rights to works that 
involve unlawful actions in their creative process or involve unlawful actions in 
the exercise of rights to works.57  Similarly, Congress may deny protection for 
works that are harmful to society’s preservation under its power to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts.58  Doctrinal discussion is thus necessary 
in other works.  Here, this Article notes merely that judgments must be made 
to apply the general moral limitation of labor theory.
C. Autonomy-Personality
The third theory of intellectual property is the theory of autonomy and 
personality.  This theory recognizes a moral claim to a creative work because 
the work reflects who the creator is as a person and manifests his or her auton-
omous choices.59  This theory is the least influential in intellectual property 
law;60 therefore, any moral limitations that this theory might imply are likely to 
matter less as compared to limitations in the other theories.  This theory and its 
moral limitations are discussed below.
1. Theory and Intellectual Property
The writings of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel have 
given rise to the autonomy-personality theory (or autonomy theory).  Kant 
and Hegel recognize a moral claim to property rights over an object because 
57. See Snow, supra note 20.
58. See Snow, supra note 21.
59. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 171–72.
60. See id. at 173.
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individuals exercise their autonomy and will through the object.61  Objects 
enable us to make choices, which is a compelling reason for giving us rights to 
control the object.  Under this theory of property, then, rights exist to effectu-
ate a person’s basic human desires.
This philosophy applies well to intellectual creations.  Intellectual cre-
ations manifest a person’s personality and exercise of will, even more so than 
a physical object.62  Indeed, exercising the intellect to create a work constitutes 
the very exercise of will and personality that this theory recognizes as giving 
moral claim to property rights.  Whether you create an expression or an inven-
tion, the creation manifests your choices; a part of your person is manifest 
through the creation.  On this ground, you have a moral claim to control the 
use of the creative work.  Therefore, autonomy theory recognizes an individu-
al’s moral claim to property rights in intellectual creations.
The immediate implication of this moral theory is that people ought to 
decide for themselves the subject matter of their creations which receive intel-
lectual property protection.  That is, the theory suggests that if the government 
believes that a work lacks moral value, this fact should not be a reason to deny 
protection for intellectual works.  The individual’s moral claim to intellectual 
property rights is based on the individual’s choices and values that give rise to 
the creation.  This theory therefore recognizes moral value simply in refraining 
from denying protection because a creator’s individuality merits recogni-
tion of rights.
2. Moral Limitations
The autonomy theory is not without moral limitation.  Kant wrote that a 
person exercising her will over an object cannot inhibit others from exercising 
their wills.63  This principle could be seen as a basis for arguing that an author’s 
own exercise of will should not inhibit others’ creativity, such as precluding 
subsequent authors from creating follow-on works.64  Yet the principle need 
61. See Merges, supra note 4, at 68–85 (discussing Kant); Hughes, supra note 25, at 330–65 
(discussing Hegel); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright and Personhood, 2019 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1039, 1041 (discussing the influence of both Hegel and Kant).
62. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of 
the Artistic Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945, 1947 (2006) (examining “spiritual or 
inspirational motivations that are inherent in the creative task,” including “the desire 
for challenge, personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with a particular meaning 
or significance for the author”); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Authors and 
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81, 83, 138–79 (1998) 
(recognizing personhood interests in intellectual property based on intentionality and 
sourcehood).
63. See Merges, supra note 4, at 87–88.
64. Cf. Yoo, supra note 61, at 1042 (conceptualizing personhood theory in terms of how the 
process of creation itself promotes self-actualization); Immanuel Kant, On the Wrong-
fulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books (1785), reprinted in Practical Phi-
losophy 28, 35 n.* (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (“This 
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not be limited to the context of subsequent authors’ creativity.  Indeed, the 
application of this principle to all aspects of autonomy is apparent from Kant’s 
categorical imperative, which requires each person to respect the humanity 
(and thereby autonomy) in all other persons, and act only according to rules 
that could universally apply for everyone.65  Inhibiting others’ will would not 
respect the humanity or autonomy of others, and the reason for such treatment 
would not be able to serve as a universal rule.66  Hence, if the categorical imper-
ative condemns the particular act of exercising one’s will over an object, Kant 
would condemn the act, such that it would not give rise to property rights.67 
Accordingly, where the exercise of one’s will over an object would inhibit 
another’s autonomy, one should not hold property rights in that object.68
Applying this moral limitation to the context of intellectual property 
suggests that intellectual property rights should not be recognized where intel-
lectual creations inhibit the autonomy of others.  For instance, a murderer 
who creates a video of himself murdering another has definitely inhibited the 
other’s autonomy in order to create his work.  The moral limitation would 
therefore suggest against recognizing copyright.  Likewise, an infectious dis-
ease invented to cause human suffering inhibits others’ autonomy, so it should 
not receive patent protection.  Simply put, the moral limitation of autonomy 
theory implies that certain creations should not receive protection.
As with the utilitarian and labor theories, problems arise with defining 
and assessing harm under this moral limitation within autonomy theory.  Many 
creations may appear moral, yet from a different perspective those creations 
may seem to inhibit others’ autonomy.  An example may be the jet engine, 
which inhibits people’s opportunity to view the sky in its natural state: Does 
this mean that the jet engine should not receive patent protection?  How do 
we determine which inhibitions of autonomy are acceptable and which are 
not?  There may not be an easy answer as all acts—to a certain extent—affect 
others, and the effects on others preclude certain choices.  Merely by interact-
ing with someone, a person precludes another from acting in a certain way; to 
a degree, the person has inhibited another’s autonomy.  Where should the law 
draw the line?
right of the author is . . . not a right to the thing, namely to the copy (for the owner can 
burn it before the author’s eyes), but an innate right in his own person, namely, to pre-
vent another from having him speak to the public without his consent . . . .”).
65. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 38, 45 
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Merch. Books 2009) (1785).
66. See id. at 48 (requiring that a maxim for action not frustrate the will of natural beings).
67. See id.
68. According to scholar Justin Hughes, Hegel recognized that “unhealthy identifications 
with property . . . should not give rise to legitimate property claims.”  Hughes, supra note 
25, at 335.  “Hegel hinted that certain self-identifications with property were destructive 
to the individual.”  Id.
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The practical answer to this question is likely that this limitation should 
be a consideration, but not an absolute restriction, in recognizing intellectual 
property rights under autonomy theory.  The government actor who is defining 
eligibility should consider the degree to which the creative activity or creation 
restricts others’ autonomy.  That is, the presumption to recognize creative activ-
ity with intellectual property rights should be weighed against the activity’s 
negative effects on others.  Autonomy theory therefore suggests a general prin-
ciple that should limit the recognition of rights in a creator.
In summary, the three theories of intellectual property—utilitarian, labor, 
and autonomy—all recognize certain moral values in defining the boundaries 
of intellectual property.  First, utilitarian theory recognizes consequentialist 
moralism, such that a creation should not receive property rights if it decreases 
societal utility.69  This limitation applies where market failures stemming from 
negative externalities and asymmetric information are present in the market 
for certain intellectual creations.70  Second, labor-desert theory posits an 
individual’s moral claim to property based on the labor that she expends to 
create the subject matter.71  The theory is premised on certain moral values, 
the absence of which would negate a person’s moral claim to property, includ-
ing acting in a way that does not harm the health, life, property, or liberty of 
another, or that harms the preservation of society generally.72  Third, auton-
omy theory implies a moral claim to property in an intellectual creation based 
on the creation’s manifestation of the person and her autonomy.73  The theory 
favors recognizing rights in all subject matter, with a general limitation that 
creations should not inhibit others’ exercise of autonomy.74
II. Arguments Against Moral Limitations
Academic commentators have questioned the proposition of deny-
ing intellectual property protection on moral grounds.  Issues of free speech 
always arise, and those are more fully addressed in another article.75  Putting 
aside those speech issues, the most common questions that commentators have 
raised are the following:
(a) Would the effect of denying intellectual property actually increase the 
output of the harmful works that you are trying to prevent?
69. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.2.
70. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.2.
71. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.1.
72. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.2.
73. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.1.
74. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.2.
75. Ned Snow, Barring Immoral Speech Through Patent and Copyright, 74 SMU L.  Rev. 
(forthcoming 2021).
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(b) The goal of intellectual property is not to control harmful or otherwise 
immoral behavior.  Should we not leave the job of curbing such behavior 
to criminal law?
(c) Why should we trust the government to make moral decisions for us?  
Should we not instead allow the free market to determine the moral value 
of intellectual creations?
The three questions above represent theoretical challenges to the argu-
ment for moral limitations in intellectual property.  Although the argument 
also raises doctrinal, policy, and constitutional issues (which are addressed in 
other articles),76 this Article focuses on issues of theory.  Hence, the three the-
oretical challenges are discussed next.
A. The Propagation Argument
Perhaps the most common argument against denying protection is the 
propagation argument.  The argument contends that denying intellectual 
property protection will propagate copies of the works already in existence, 
resulting in a net increase of the work.77  Intellectual property, then, should 
exist to decrease the propagation of undesirable subject matter.  This “propa-
gation argument” often arises in the context of pornography: deny copyright 
for pornography and everyone will start copying and distributing it, flooding 
the market with the very material that you are trying to reduce.  This Subpart 
explains this argument and responds to it.
1. Argument
Without intellectual property protection, a work may be freely copied, 
distributed, and consumed.78  So if the law removes copyright or patent protec-
tion for a work, the supply of that work may dramatically increase.  For works 
that are immoral, the possibility of unrestricted dissemination and access is 
obviously a problem.  Therefore, denying protection would seem to make the 
problem of immoral works worse—not better.  This is the essence of the prop-
agation argument.79
This propagation argument is stronger than it may initially appear.  At first 
glance, one might think that denying protection would not increase the propa-
gation of works (immoral or otherwise) because the denial would remove the 
76. Id.; Snow, supra note 20; Snow, supra note 21.
77. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 961–66 (2010) (arguing that patent and copyright 
should exist for certain works that social policy suggests should be decreased).
78. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth rights in a copyright); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (setting 
forth rights in a patent).
79. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 Stan. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 119, 156–57 (2012) (“[D]enying copyright protection and trademark protec-
tion to works and marks deemed pornographic or immoral may actually increase their 
dissemination.”).
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economic incentive to create the works in the first place.80  However, this line 
of thinking does not account for works that are already in existence.  For works 
already in existence at the time of the denial, the denial would result in their 
free copying and dissemination.  For instance, suppose that Congress were to 
deny protection for all pornographic works.  Even if that denial decreased pro-
duction of future pornographic works, existent pornographic works for which 
authors sought to enforce copyright would immediately become freely avail-
able for anyone to copy, distribute, perform, or display.  Propagation would 
flourish.  In effect, although denying the copyright or patent incentive may 
result in fewer of those works created, that effect of the denial would be more 
than offset by the free copying and distribution of existent works.
Adding further strength to the propagation argument is the fact that not 
all works require intellectual property protection to exist.81  If a work would 
exist without intellectual property protection, then the intellectual property 
rights would not incentivize the work’s creation, such that the rights (if exer-
cised) would only serve to stifle the work’s dissemination.82  For those works, 
denying intellectual property rights would not affect their creation, but at the 
same time the denial would increase their free propagation.  This reasoning 
draws support from an argument made by Christopher Cotropia and James 
Gibson.83  They have argued this point with respect to pornography, tax-plan-
ning schemes, and morally controversial biotechnologies.84  For pornography, 
they point out that the internet has given rise to amateur pornographers who 
have created a supply of pornographic works, seemingly without relying on any 
copyright incentive.85  Similarly, for tax-planning schemes, accountants create 
those schemes for the simple reason of helping their clients avoid payment of 
taxes, regardless of patent protection.86
Likewise, other intellectual works may be produced in the absence of 
copyright or patent protection simply because the cost of creating the work is 
relatively low.  For instance, suppose that an inventor creates a device for con-
suming nicotine, and that she invents the device at minimal cost.  The cost is so 
low that her economic advantage of being the first to market exceeds that min-
imal development cost.  The fact that competitors face no development costs 
for the nicotine device does not give them any advantage.  Although the inven-
tor might seek patent protection for her nicotine device if it is available, even 
80. See Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. Rev.  259, 
314.
81. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 77, at 936.
82. See id. at 937.
83. See id. at 923.  Other commentators have made similar arguments with respect to “re-
venge porn,” which is nude photographs that an ex-partner in a relationship distributes. 
See infra note 134.
84. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 77, at 940–53, 961–66.
85. See id. at 964.
86. See id. at 944–45.
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if it is not available, she would still produce her device in a competitive market. 
These sorts of works would be created independent of the copyright or patent 
incentive, so the rights of copyright and patent would not serve to incentiv-
ize their creation.  Nevertheless, for these sorts of works, copyright and patent 
may still serve to suppress dissemination if rights holders exercise their rights. 
Hence, for some works, denying protection would not decrease their creation, 
but could increase their propagation.
In view of this fact, intellectual property denial for certain sorts of 
immoral works would not seem to make sense.  For immoral works that would 
be created without the incentive of intellectual property, intellectual property 
rights would serve only to reduce the propagation of those works.  The rights 
would keep the public from freely reproducing, distributing, and accessing the 
works without incentivizing the production of those works.  For this reason, 
Cotropia and Gibson have argued that intellectual property should be granted 
to certain works that public policy suggests should not be propagated.87  Cotro-
pia and Gibson have contended that for certain works, intellectual property 
should serve “to suppress innovation and production” of works, contrary to its 
“usual goal.”88  In effect, they argue, intellectual property should serve “as a 
regulatory instrument” in limited circumstances.89  Cotropia and Gibson con-
clude: “We should grant protection when—indeed, because—its net effect is to 
discourage innovation in a disfavored industry.”90
2. Response
The propagation argument certainly raises a strong reason to doubt that, 
for some works, denying intellectual property protection would decrease the 
net output of those works.  In this regard, this Article does not disagree with 
that portion of Cotropia’s and Gibson’s argument: for some works, grant-
ing protection could in fact decrease the net output.  However, this Article 
disagrees with a fundamental premise of their argument—that intellectual 
property can be used “as a regulatory instrument,” so that its costs “can be 
turned around and used to promote a policy that is the exact opposite of intel-
lectual property’s usual goal.”91  To the contrary, intellectual property should 
not be employed for anything other than its “usual goal.”92  Even if granting 
87. Id. at 923.
88. Id. at 923, 938, 976.
89. Id. at 938.
90. Id. at 923.
91. Id. at 938.
92. Id.  Jake Linford has defined several values within the Intellectual Property Clause, 
including incentivizing creation and dissemination of works, expanding knowledge, and 
providing access to works.  Jake Linford, The Institutional Progress Clause, 16 Vand. J. 
Ent. & Tech. L. 533, 555–66 (2014).  Justin Hughes has defined the “primary objective 
of intellectual property” to be “increasing society’s stock of knowledge.”  Hughes, supra 
note 25, at 295.  These conclusions suggest that the intellectual property may only be 
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intellectual property protection might, in some cases, decrease the dissemi-
nation and creation of works, the government should not grant intellectual 
property rights for that purpose.
As discussed in Part I, the three theories that underlie intellectual prop-
erty indicate that the purpose of granting intellectual property protection is 
to incentivize the production of works, to reward efforts in creating works, 
and to recognize an individual’s autonomy and personality.  Those theories do 
not indicate a purpose of suppressing the production of works for any reason. 
More specifically, utilitarian theory calls for the government to intervene in the 
commercial marketplace because of a market failure that causes an underpro-
duction of works.93  Under this theory, intellectual property protection exists 
for the sole purpose of incentivizing the production of works in response to a 
market failure caused by the public-good nature of intellectual property.  The 
government is not attempting to decrease an overproduction of works when it 
grants rights.94  Similarly, labor-desert theory calls for the government to reward 
efforts that produce creative works.95  Under this theory, the grant of intellec-
tual property is premised on rewarding only actions that are nonharmful; the 
grant is not premised on curing harmful effects of a work.96  Finally, autonomy 
theory calls for the government to recognize the autonomy and personality of 
a person by granting intellectual property rights.97  The grant is not intended to 
suppress a creator’s autonomy and personality.98  Therefore, none of the theo-
ries justifying the government’s grant of intellectual property protection works 
rely on any reason remotely related to reducing the output of a work.
One might argue that granting intellectual property as a means to reduce 
the production of harmful works would further the overall utility of society. 
From a general perspective, utilitarianism would seem to support this use of 
intellectual property.  Yet even so, such a utilitarian theory would be distinct 
from the incentive theory of utilitarianism discussed in Part I.  And perhaps 
this is the point of the argument by Cotropia and Gibson: they explicitly argue 
that intellectual property should be employed for a use outside of the conven-
tional theories.99  For three reasons discussed in the Subparts below, this Article 
contends that such a use of intellectual property is not advisable.
a. Tool for Censorship
The most problematic aspect of granting intellectual property protec-
tion in order to suppress further propagation of works is that such a grant 
employed to increase the output of creative works.
93. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.1.
94. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.2.
95. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.
96. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.2.
97. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.1.
98. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.2.
99. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 77, at 923.
104 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 28:75
would employ intellectual property as a means to censor ideas and expression. 
Employed in this way, the law of intellectual property would serve the same 
purpose as copyright did under the British Crown in the mid 1600s.  Fearing 
the threat of the printing press, the British Crown decreed exclusive printing 
monopolies to a single entity, the Stationers’ Company: to print in the 1600s, 
a person would need to employ the Stationers’ Company, and the Stationers’ 
Company would print only that which pleased the Crown.100  Effectively, then, 
the Crown granted copyright protection to the Stationers’ Company in order 
to facilitate censorship (rather than creativity).
In the next century, the purpose of granting monopolies changed dra-
matically.  Parliament passed the Statute of Anne in 1710, adopting an entirely 
contrary rationale for intellectual property—namely, to incentivize the creation 
of works for the benefit of public learning.101  This purpose then became imbed-
ded in the U.S. Constitution, providing Congress power to grant copyright and 
patent protection as a means to incentivize works that will encourage learning 
and knowledge.102  Hence, granting intellectual property protection for the ulti-
mate end of censoring content is the very purpose that was rejected by both 
Parliament in 1710 and the Framers in 1787.  To grant copyright for the purpose 
of decreasing dissemination of content is antithetical to the well-established 
purpose of copyright.  Stated differently, to grant intellectual property for the 
purpose of controlling the output of an immoral work contravenes three centu-
ries of intellectual property history.  Since 1710, the clear utilitarian purpose of 
intellectual property has been to promote works—not to censor them.
Thus, the reason against using intellectual property as a tool for censor-
ship amounts to a historical argument: we tried it in the past and it did not work 
so well.  Yet why did it not work so well?  Was the problem that the Crown was 
simply not accountable for censoring content?  Arguably, more transparency 
and accountability exists today than three centuries ago, and if the government 
abused its power to exercise intellectual property denials today, the democratic 
process could (in theory) correct the abuse.  What, then, is the problem in the 
100. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Found-
ers’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909, 913–14 (2003) (“In short, the hallmarks of 
the stationers’ copyright were monopoly and censorship (in the hands of publishers 
as agents of the government) with no public ownership of, or access as of right to, any 
works  .  .  .  .” (emphasis omitted)); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly 
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 675, 680–82 
(2002).
101. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.) (repealed 
1842).
102. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 
(1966) (“The clause . . . . was written against the backdrop of the practices—eventually 
curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court 
favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”).
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modern era with using a grant of intellectual property as a means to control the 
output of immoral works?
At bottom, the problem with employing intellectual property as a means 
to cure moral problems is that those problems usually involve complexities 
that intellectual property is not designed to address.  Intellectual property as a 
means of solving a social problem represents a blunt instrument, at best.  That 
is, monopoly pricing does not work well to resolve societal problems that follow 
from creative works.  Addictive substances, for instance, may still cause great 
harm to individuals regardless of how high the patentee sets the price for those 
substances.  Price may have some effect indirectly, but the effect will depend 
on the elasticity of the demand curve for the good.103  Price does not directly 
address the underlying problem.  Thus, monopoly pricing through granting 
intellectual property rights represents an indirect means to curb behavior that 
involves complex problems.  For this reason, intellectual property should not 
be a means for curing problems or controlling behavior.  Protection should not 
be granted in order to reduce the output of a work.
There is a counterargument to this conclusion.  One might contend that 
there is no practical difference between a grant of protection or a denial of pro-
tection when either is made for the purpose of decreasing the output of works. 
That is, in either situation of grant or denial, it would seem that the government 
is acting to decrease production of a work.  For some works, decreasing produc-
tion is arguably better accomplished by denying protection; for other works, 
(like pornography), decreasing production is arguably better accomplished 
by granting protection.  Whether the government grants or denies intellectual 
property protection, the act may be seen as a tool for decreasing production. 
According to this counterargument, granting protection should not be viewed 
as unwarranted censorship if denying protection accomplishes the same sort 
of censorship.  If the denial is justified to censor, the grant should be as well.
This counterargument relies on a false premise.  Specifically, the coun-
terargument assumes that denials are justified as a means of decreasing 
production.  That is not so.  As discussed in Part I, the theories of intellectual 
property call for denial only when the reason for granting protection is lack-
ing.  Under utilitarian theory, denial is appropriate when a negative externality 
or asymmetric information causes a market failure that results in an overpro-
duction of a work, thereby canceling the justification for granting protection 
(namely, a market failure that results in the underproduction of a work, which 
follows from the public-good nature of the work).  The denial is not intended 
to resolve the problems of the negative externality or the asymmetric infor-
mation.  Under labor-desert theory, denial is appropriate when creative efforts 
103. See generally Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 Anti-
trust L.J. 363, 364–67 (1998) (explaining that the effect of changing the price of a good 
on the quantity demanded depends on the elasticity of the demand curve for the good).
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have harmed the life, health, goods, or autonomy of another.  Those harms 
undermine the argument that a creator’s efforts entitle her to property rights. 
The denial, then, is not intended to cure the harms that result from the cre-
ator’s actions.  Under autonomy-personality theory, denial is appropriate when 
a creator has inhibited another person’s autonomy.  The denial represents a 
choice not to support the creator’s inhibition of autonomy; it is not intended to 
rectify, or serve as a remedy for, that situation.  Simply put, none of the theories 
imply that denial is appropriate to decrease the production of works.  None of 
the theories treats intellectual property as a means for resolving the problem 
that undermines the justification for granting intellectual property.
Thus, neither the grant nor the denial of intellectual property should be 
viewed as a means to decrease the output of undesired works.  More specif-
ically, granting or denying intellectual property should not be the means to 
resolve the social problems that stem from the creation or dissemination of 
certain works.  This is because the choice to grant or deny protection cannot 
address the complexities that surround specific behavior.  Each moral prob-
lem is different, calling for a different sort of solution.  That is not the design of 
intellectual property.
Yet if not through intellectual property, how should the law deal with 
moral problems that arise in the production or dissemination of intellectual 
works?  The answer will depend on the sort of work at issue and the cir-
cumstances surrounding market supply and demand.  In some situations, a 
laissez-faire approach may be most effective.  That approach would require 
denying intellectual property protection so that the market itself would bring 
about a desired result.  Suppose, for instance, that a pharmaceutical drug causes 
harmful side effects to its users and the users do not usually internalize this 
cost in deciding whether to consume the drug.  Suppose further that, in view of 
this fact, Congress denies patent protection for inventions requiring the use of 
the drug.  Given that the creation and dissemination of pharmaceutical drugs is 
usually driven by the promise of monetary compensation, inventors (and inves-
tors) will not bother to expend resources to invent and disseminate products 
relating to the drug: without exclusivity over those inventions, the inventors 
cannot recover their costs of research and development.  Production of the 
drug-related inventions would decrease, and the market might end up reduc-
ing the proliferation of the harmful-drug inventions.104  The market—with its 
characteristic of failing to compensate for public goods—could alleviate the 
social problem.  Although the denial of patent protection would play a role 
in decreasing production, the market would ultimately be responsible for that 
result.  By denying patent protection, the law simply lets the market play out.  A 
104. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 32, at 1581–82 (describing the extreme costliness of 
pharmaceutical research and development).
2021] MORAL BARS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 107
laissez-faire approach therefore allows market forces determine the fate of the 
work, such that the market is ultimately responsible for a decrease in output.
Of course, the laissez-faire approach does not work in all situations.  As 
discussed above, denying protection might result in the propagation of unde-
sired works that have already been created.105  In such situations, tort, criminal, 
and regulatory laws might be necessary to facilitate a reduction of the specific 
intellectual works at issue—or more precisely, those other areas of law may be 
necessary to resolve the moral problem.  With respect to inventions, tort lia-
bility might decrease distribution of machines that are potentially harmful to 
users or others.106  EPA regulations for pollution might decrease incentives to 
use polluting devices.107  Government programs that provide drug education 
and rehabilitation counseling may be effective at solving problematic behav-
ior that follows from addictive substances.108  With respect to expressions, tort 
liability might reduce the likelihood of defamatory expression.109  Criminal 
obscenity laws, if enforced, can deter the production and distribution of spe-
cific sorts of immoral content.110  The point is that laws specifically directed 
to the moral issue may be most effective at controlling problematic behavior. 
They can be tailored to the cause and symptoms of the problem.
Thus, intellectual property should not be the means for resolving a prob-
lem that intellectual property was never intended to remedy.  A grant or denial 
of patent or copyright cannot begin to be as effective as other legal mechanisms 
that the government can tailor to the specific moral problem.  In short, intellec-
tual property has everything to do with whether the law should encourage or 
reward behavior.  It has nothing to do with whether the law should discourage 
or punish behavior.  It should not be employed as a tool of censorship.
b. Reward for Bad Behavior
Another problem with the propagation argument is that it rewards bad 
behavior.  Recall that the labor theory rewards the intellectual labor of creat-
ing, but that theory assumes that such labor will not harm the life, health, or 
possessions of another.111  Simply put, harmful behavior does not deserve a 
property right.  This tenet of the labor theory contradicts the propagation argu-
ment, which calls for the law to grant intellectual property rights to creators of 
105. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 77, at 961–66.
106. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (imposing 
strict liability for unreasonable dangers based on design defects of a product).
107. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
108. E.g., Provide Education and Training, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Ad-
min. (July 22, 2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/workplace/toolkit/plan-implement-pro-
gram/provide-training [https://perma.cc/Z8J5-LE8H].
109. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (explaining 
liability for defamation).
110. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464–1465, 2252(a) (criminalizing broadcasting of obscene material, 
sale or transfer of obscene material, and distribution of child pornography respectively).
111. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.2.a.
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harmful works.  Indeed, according to the propagation argument, creators of 
harmful works should receive a monopoly precisely because their works are 
harmful.  Hence, the propagation argument attempts to effectuate a societal 
end that is good (specifically, reducing the dissemination of immoral works) 
by rewarding behavior that is bad (specifically, giving monopolies to those who 
cause harm to others).  This act of rewarding bad behavior contravenes the 
fundamental premise of the labor theory—that intellectual property rewards 
good behavior.
Rewarding bad behavior is problematic because the law has never 
adopted this norm as a means for effectuating policy ends.  As a general matter, 
the law does not attempt to reduce harmful effects of behavior by encourag-
ing private monopolies over that behavior.  Consider, for instance, harmful 
effects of certain drugs—say, the poor health effects of consuming cocaine. 
It is certainly possible to legalize the cocaine trade and refrain from enforc-
ing antitrust laws against the few drug lords who would quickly dominate the 
market.  Those few drug lords would increase the price of cocaine so dramat-
ically that some users might stop consuming, which would ultimately reduce 
poor health effects of consuming cocaine.  Likewise, the government could 
refrain from enforcing antitrust laws against tobacco companies, marijuana 
enterprises, or even businesses in the trade of excessively sugary drinks.  The 
resulting monopolies (or oligopolies) that would form might price their goods 
so high that some consumers would cease consumption.  But the law does not 
pursue this means for controlling the harmful effects of these products.  This 
way of curbing behavior—by facilitating private monopolies—has the effect of 
rewarding producers of harmful substances.  It rewards bad actors.  No matter 
how laudable the end, it does not justify the means.  That use of the law is 
immoral not only under the labor theory, but under general moral theories of 
law.  Hence, applying the reasoning of the propagation argument to other con-
texts reveals the moral weakness of that argument.
c. Further Problems
There are three other problems with the propagation argument.  The first 
problem relates to free speech.  In order to understand this problem, we must 
recognize that a tension exists between copyright and free speech.112  Copyright 
law suppresses other persons from being able to freely express copyrighted 
speech: I cannot repeat expression that you have copyrighted, so copyright 
law is suppressing my choice to speak copied expression.  Yet free-speech doc-
trine tolerates this suppression of copied expression because the suppression 
of copied speech yields an increase in original copyrighted speech: the sup-
pressive effect of copyright has the desirable effect of effectuating a monopoly 
112. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (recognizing First Amendment safe-
guards in copyright law).
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incentive for speakers to create original expression in the first place.113  In 
other words, you speak your copyrighted expression because you receive a 
right to suppress me from speaking your expression.  So without that copyright, 
you may not have created your expression.  Hence, free-speech law tolerates 
copyright’s suppressive effect on repeating other’s expression because the sup-
pressive effect serves to incentivize that original expression.
If, however, copyright exists only to reduce the output of expression (under 
the propagation argument), the justification for suppressing copied expression 
does not exist.  Recall that the propagation argument posits that in some sit-
uations denying copyright would increase the output of certain expression, so 
in those situations and where the certain expression is undesired, copyright 
should be granted to reduce the output of expression.114  Pornography is the 
example of this situation (cited by Cotropia and Gibson): copyright should 
exist to reduce the overall output of pornography.115  Yet this argument is prob-
lematic from a speech standpoint.  If employed only to reduce speech output, 
copyright is not serving to incentivize speech.116  Copyright’s suppressive effect 
on repeated expression could not be justified as a means to incentivize original 
speech because the purpose of copyright would be to reduce the overall pro-
duction of speech.  Any incentivizing of speech would be secondary to reducing 
the overall output of speech.  In the pornography example, the propagation 
argument treats copyright as serving to reduce the dissemination of undesired 
pornographic works.  Copyright in that situation serves only to restrict copied 
speech without any offsetting speech-increase justification.  The upshot is that 
the propagation argument contradicts the justification for copyright’s suppres-
sive effect on speech.  To justify copyright under free-speech law, copyright 
must exist for the purpose of increasing speech output.
The second problem with the propagation argument is that it relies on 
conditions that are difficult to prove.  It relies on the assumption that rights 
holders will enforce their rights even though those rights do not usually incen-
tivize the production of that sort of work.  That assumption is often dubious. 
For example, it seems difficult to establish that a creator of pornography, who 
does not create the work for any reason of financial gain, will nevertheless 
choose to enforce his copyright against people who freely disseminate his 
pornographic work.  Why would he sue for damages if money was never the 
113. See id. (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. 
By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985))).
114. See discussion supra Subpart II.A.1.
115. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 77, at 961–66.
116. Cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (“But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is 
unnecessary.”).
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reason for creating the work in the first place?  Even though the answer to this 
question varies by the type of work under consideration, the answer would be 
difficult to prove one way or the other.
The propagation argument further relies on another uncertain factual 
condition.  The condition must exist where any additional creators incentivized 
by the intellectual property rights will not produce more works than would 
be freely disseminated by consumers if there were no copyright.  Assume, 
for example, that some producers of pornographic works would not produce 
their works without copyright.  If copyright were denied, would the decrease 
of those producers result in less pornography even though there would be an 
increase of users freely copying and disseminating it?  A necessary condition 
of the propagation argument is that there would not be such a net decrease.  As 
an empirical matter, that seems difficult to prove.
The propagation argument thus relies on the existence of certain con-
ditions.  This matters because the argument portrays intellectual property as 
serving a role that is warranted only because of exceptional circumstances. 
Normal circumstances suggest that intellectual property will, on balance, yield 
a net increase in the output of any sort of work; the propagation argument 
relies on the exceptional circumstance where intellectual property will, on bal-
ance, yield a net decrease in the output of a certain sort of work.117  By relying 
on a circumstance that is exceptional, the propagation argument must prove 
that that circumstance does exist to justify application of intellectual property’s 
exceptional role.  In the absence of such certainty, the propagation argument’s 
exceptional doctrine simply cannot apply: the usual presumptions that under-
lie incentive theory must control, and in particular, the law must presume that 
granting intellectual property protection will incentivize the production and 
dissemination of works more so than denying protection.  In short, the propa-
gation argument presents a theoretical argument that lacks practical certainty, 
and that certainty is necessary to overcome the presumptions inherent in the 
incentive theory.
The third problem is that the propagation argument does not hold true 
for works that are already freely available.  Recall that the propagation argu-
ment contends that by granting protection, there will be a decrease in overall 
dissemination of some works because the rights holders would restrict access 
by enforcing their rights.  As previously stated, it is questionable whether rights 
holders, who need no incentive to create the works, would start enforcing their 
rights if their works were already freely disseminated.  Even assuming that 
117. The “normal circumstances” represent the economic assumptions underlying the In-
tellectual Property Clause—that monopoly protection is necessary to incentivize the 
creation and dissemination of creative works.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between 
the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle compe-
tition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
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they would, the enforcement would not restrict overall access if there is an 
infinite supply available.  In the pornography context, as long as some pornog-
raphy may be freely consumed from accessible sites (for instance, PornHub), 
there will be a practically infinite supply available.  The fact that some other 
sites or aggregators of content enforce their copyright does not present any 
meaningful decrease in the infinite amount available on PornHub.  In this cir-
cumstance, enforcing copyright against some would not affect the practically 
infinite supply of pornography available.  The grant would affect only the por-
nographers (likely the for-profit pornographers) who rely on the existence of 
copyright for their works.  Granting protection does not reduce public access 
to the infinite supply available.
In sum, the justification for granting intellectual property rights can either 
be that the government is intervening in the free marketplace to cure a market 
failure, that the government is rewarding worthy behavior, or that the govern-
ment is recognizing individual autonomy and personality.  Reducing the output 
of undesirable expression, as suggested in the propagation argument, does not 
fit within any of these justifications.  Moreover, the propagation argument is 
problematic for other reasons.  It treats intellectual property as a tool for cen-
sorship, which is inconsistent with its constitutional and historical purpose, and 
which is a poor means for addressing the complexities of moral problems.  The 
propagation argument reasons that rewarding bad behavior may lead to a good 
outcome, but the law traditionally rejects such means of achieving outcomes. 
The argument supposes a reason for copyright that stands in conflict with basic 
principles of free speech without offering any counterbalancing speech justifi-
cation.  The argument relies on assumptions that are difficult to establish.  And 
because the argument cannot apply where works are already freely available, 
it would not seem to apply in any practical situation.
B. The Other-Laws Argument
Related to the propagation argument is the argument that controlling a 
moral problem is the role of other laws—not intellectual property.  In other 
words, because the purpose of intellectual property is not to address the 
moral problems that other laws can address, morality should not be a basis 
for denying intellectual property protection.118  This argument, which I call the 
“other-laws argument,” is partially addressed in my response to the propaga-
tion argument above, so it may seem repetitive to include this as a separate 
argument.  Yet the argument is often raised as an independent reason for why 
intellectual property should not be denied for immoral works.119  Furthermore, 
118. Cf. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(making this other-laws argument in the context of refusing to deny copyright protec-
tion to legally obscene works).
119. See Rothman, supra note 79, at 169 (citing other laws that should regulate harmful be-
havior related to sexual activity, and concluding that none of the activity “is properly the 
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the other-laws argument goes deeper than the propagation argument, for the 
other-laws argument concerns the very nature of intellectual property.  To put 
it simply, if intellectual property rights constitute inviolable rights—much like 
real property rights—then moral problems should be dealt with only through 
other laws.  It is thus useful to address the other-laws argument separately.
1. Argument
Denying intellectual property protection to solve moral problems invites 
gross inefficiencies and unintended consequences.  Intellectual property pro-
tection represents only one variable among many that may affect a moral 
problem.  Removing that variable may have little effect on or even exacerbate 
the problem.  Indeed, denial of intellectual property represents a blunt instru-
ment for resolving complex problems.  Global warming, for instance, will not 
be solved through denying patents for novel technologies that pollute.  Gun 
violence will not be solved by denying copyright for violent video games.  To 
be sure, denying intellectual property protection will not necessarily decrease 
problematic technologies or expressions, and more to the point, the denial 
does not directly address the problematic consequences that may follow from 
those works.  For most moral problems, denial of intellectual property protec-
tion does not represent a practically effective solution.
By contrast, other laws can directly address a specific moral problem. 
Other laws can be tailored specifically to the cause and symptoms of the prob-
lem.  Regulating when a consumer can purchase a gun or how health providers 
should care for those with mental-health disorders are much more effective at 
controlling gun violence than is denying a copyright for violent video games. 
Regulating air quality standards is much more effective at controlling pollu-
tion levels than is denying patents for polluting technologies.  Criminalizing 
dangerously destructive expression is much more effective at controlling death 
threats than is denying copyright law for that expression.  In short, intellectual 
property was never intended to solve the world’s problems.  It is a poor substi-
tute for specific laws tailored to specific problems.
2. Response
This Article disagrees with the premise that the effectiveness of other 
laws at controlling immoral behavior should be reason not to deny intellec-
tual property protection.  In truth, the effectiveness of those laws is reason 
not to grant that protection.  Granting protection to works that cause or stem 
from problematic behavior encourages and rewards the behavior, in contra-
diction with other laws that are attempting to reduce or otherwise control that 
same behavior.  Granting protection in that situation thereby threatens the 
purview of IP law”).
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effectiveness of those other laws.  To encourage and reward behavior that other 
laws condemn simply does not make sense.
a. IP Theories
That other laws may effectively control immoral behavior is irrelevant to 
the intellectual property theories that dictate whether to grant or deny protec-
tion.  The theories imply the grant or denial of protection independent from 
whether other laws may resolve moral problems better than intellectual prop-
erty.  As already discussed, the theories of intellectual property suggest that 
there are certain moral limits on intellectual property protection.120  The exis-
tence of other laws does not change those limits.
Consider one example to illustrate the point: an inventor creates a 
method of torturing humans.  It is very possible that the inventor would have 
created the method whether or not the law would grant him a patent.  Assum-
ing that the inventor intends to practice his method of torture, the absence of 
a patent will not deter his immoral act from occurring.  Laws that criminalize 
torture would be more likely to prevent or otherwise control the inventor’s 
actions.  But the fact that criminal law is more likely to deter the immoral act 
does not change the fact that labor theory implies that a patent should not be 
granted for such an invention.  Labor theory condemns the harmful effects that 
follow from the torturous invention, and for that reason, the inventor does not 
deserve patent protection.  The reason is not because labor theory demands 
control or restraint of the immoral activity.
The other two theories of intellectual property support this conclusion. 
As explained in Part I, utilitarian theory implies a denial of protection where 
a negative externality or asymmetric information causes a market failure that 
results in an overproduction of a work, canceling the justification for granting 
protection.  The denial is not intended to resolve the negative externality or 
the asymmetric information.  Likewise, autonomy-personality theory implies 
a denial of protection where a creator has inhibited another person’s auton-
omy.  The denial is not intended to rectify the situation.  In short, the theories 
of intellectual property that would imply denying protection are unaffected by 
the fact that other laws exist that can better control behavior.
b. IP as Violable Property
The other-laws argument seems to rely on the premise that intellectual 
property is an inviolable property right.  Underlying the other-laws argument 
seems to be the premise that even if creative works lead to moral problems, 
creators hold an inviolable right to intellectual property protection.  If cre-
ators have an inviolable, natural right to intellectual property, then any moral 
restraints implied by the theories of intellectual property would not matter.
120. See discussion supra Subparts I.A.2, I.B.2, I.C.2.
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Construed as inviolable rights, intellectual property would be like real 
property.  Under real property law, if a landowner uses his land to harm 
another, the law does not strip the landowner of property rights; rather, the law 
recognizes a distinct cause of action for nuisance, perhaps enjoining him from 
using the land in a certain way.  The landowner retains his land rights—able to 
possess, transfer, and exclude others from the land.  Analogously, if intellectual 
property is like real property, a separate law would address the harm caused 
by an immoral work, but the creator should retain intellectual property rights 
to the creation.  As an example, consider a photographer who photographs 
a private situation of another without her consent (say, a sexual encounter) 
sufficient to constitute the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.  An inviolable intel-
lectual property right would mean that although the photographer is liable in 
tort, he retains his right to exclude others from exercising his copyright in the 
work.  His intellectual property would not be denied for reasons related to the 
fact that he acted immorally (specifically, he committed a tortious act).  Thus, 
the question arises: Is intellectual property the same sort of inviolable right as 
real property?
The answer is that intellectual property is not.  Intellectual property 
has always been treated as personal property, which is a violable right.121  Its 
doctrines suggest a right that is flexible.122  In copyright, the doctrine of fair 
use implicitly recognizes that the copyright owner’s rights do not extend to 
uses that society deems laudable.123  Real property rights, by contrast, are not 
restricted based on whether a trespasser makes a laudable use of another’s 
land.  In patent, the inequitable conduct doctrine recognizes that an inventor 
can be stripped of rights for unethical disclosures to the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) about his creation of the invention.124  An owner of real 
property, by contrast, is not stripped of his rights for unethical disclosures 
about his land.125  Finally, intellectual property is not as essential to the exer-
cise of fundamental rights and the provision of necessities of life as is real 
property: real property rights enable physical means to sustain oneself, to 
121. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219 (1990) (quoting 2 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright §  9.02 (1989)) (describing copyright as “personal property”); 
Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Patent rights are a 
‘particular kind’ of personal property.”).
122. For an excellent discussion that compares the inviolability of real property to intel-
lectual property, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of 
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 593, 627–29 
(2008).
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (examining “the purpose and character” of a defendant’s use to 
determine fairness).
124. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explain-
ing doctrine of inequitable conduct in patent law).
125. It is difficult to even conceive of a situation where a landowner would be punished for 
making a representation about her land to the government that is not truthful.
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raise a family, to contribute value to society, to engage in religious practice, to 
assemble together, to voice political preference, and to speak one’s mind and 
conscience.126  By contrast, intellectual property rights may facilitate financial 
means of livelihood, but they are not essential to life and the exercise of funda-
mental rights.127  On this basis, intellectual property does not seem as inviolable 
a right as real property.128
On further reflection, the premise that intellectual property represents 
an inviolable right seems to derive from the autonomy theory.  As discussed 
in Part I, that theory treats intellectual property as the government’s recogni-
tion of personhood in an intellectual creation.129  To protect creative thought 
through law is to protect the essence of individuality.  Based on this reason-
ing, it seems to follow that a moral objection to a creative work amounts to a 
moral objection to the individuality of a person.  At a fundamental level, the 
law should refrain from making moral judgments about a person’s individual-
ity.130  If a person commits a moral wrong against another, it is appropriate to 
punish that person for his wrong, but the law should not deny his value as a 
person.  Accordingly, if a creative work is in some way harmful or otherwise 
immoral, it is appropriate to remedy the harm that the other person incurred 
through whatever law addresses that harm, but the law should not deny the 
value of the work as a manifestation of the creator’s personality and auton-
126. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1009, 1046–48, 1054–55 (2009).  The democratic model of 
property recognizes that property serves plural values and that law should reflect those 
multiple values.  Property gives us freedom and stability, provides a source of wealth 
and well-being, the bases for creative work and useful investment.  Property provides 
a place to create a family life, to nurture friendships, to rest, and to have fun.  Property 
allows us to be good neighbors and good citizens, and it promotes various human values, 
including privacy, the freedom to associate with others, religious liberty, tranquility, and 
peace of mind.  Id. at 1054 (footnote omitted).
127. This is not to say that intellectual property rights do not play a significant role in shap-
ing the culture and enjoyment of life.  Nor does this mean that intellectual creations 
themselves could not be a means of sustaining life.  Madhavi Sunder has persuasively 
argued that intellectual property is a powerful tool to promote cultural participation. 
See Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Glob-
al Justice 3 (2012) (“[C]opyright and patent laws do more than incentivize the creation 
of more goods.  They fundamentally affect human capabilities and the ability to live a 
good life.”).
128. Cf. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 355–58 (1999) (observing that 
the conceptualization of intellectual property has shifted away from a presumption of 
free access to a presumption of ownership akin to property rights in physical things, and 
arguing that free speech calls for a less-protective conception of intellectual property).
129. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.
130. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.” (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992))).
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omy.  Stated differently, underlying the other-laws argument is the belief that 
intellectual property should always serve to recognize the personhood mani-
fested within a creation, while other laws address any harms that might follow 
from the creation.
This autonomy argument for other laws to address the harms that follow 
from a creation does make some sense, but only up to a point.  Certainly, other 
laws should address problems that follow from a creation.  Yet the law should 
not recognize intellectual property rights in a creation that restricts another’s 
autonomy.  Under autonomy theory, such a creation should not be encouraged: 
to condone such creativity through legal recognition of a property right would 
be to favor one person’s exercise of autonomy over another.131  The creative act 
itself is what the law should refrain from supporting—not merely the effects 
of the creativity—for the act of creation is what ultimately leads to restricting 
another’s autonomy.  This means, then, that other laws which target the effects 
of a creative work are insufficient.  The law should not recognize that the act of 
creation itself, which is harmful to another’s autonomy, is a permissible way to 
exercise one’s individuality.  In that circumstance, denial of intellectual prop-
erty would seem appropriate.
Consider again the photographer who committed the tort of intru-
sion upon seclusion by photographing another’s sexual activity without her 
consent.132  Similarly, a person in a relationship might photograph his or her 
partner nude, and then distribute the photos after they split up—a practice 
known as creating “revenge porn.”133  In either situation, the photograph man-
ifests the photographer’s personality: it represents his creative thought and his 
exercise of autonomy with regard to how he chooses to portray individuals and 
their actions.  But this manifestation comes at a significant cost: anguish and 
suffering of the person photographed, who was not aware of either the photo-
graph occurring or the subsequent public distribution.  To grant copyright for 
the author’s creative act would be to recognize his autonomy as being more 
important than the autonomy of the person being photographed.134  The copy-
131. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.2.
132. See, e.g., Gawker Media, L.L.C. v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(granting injunction to prevent media distributor from publishing tape of famous pro-
fessional wrestler engaged in extramarital sexual activity).
133. See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. 
Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 422, 423–25 (2014) (describing revenge-porn practices).
134. Scholars have argued that subjects of such photography should be able to control the 
use of the image.  See Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 Harv. J.L. 
& Tech. 67, 71 (2018) (“IP can be used to address a broad range of social and emotion-
al vulnerabilities associated with the viral spread of images and text.”); Levendowski, 
supra note 133, at 442–44 (arguing that the subject of nude selfies can use section 512’s 
takedown procedure to limit distribution of revenge porn); Derek E. Bambauer, Ex-
posed, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2025, 2056–67 (2014) (proposing amendment to Copyright Act 
that provides subjects of “intimate media . . . the right to approve distribution or display 
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right would support an act that diminished someone else’s personhood.  Thus, 
by recognizing the photographer’s autonomy through copyright, the law would 
contradict its very purpose of supporting personhood.135  Regardless of the fact 
that the photographer could be punished under tort law, copyright law should 
not recognize his creativity as a permissible manifestation of his personality 
and autonomy.136
Thus, although the autonomy theory does support treating intellectual 
property as an inviolable right, the scope of the inviolable nature has limits. 
The argument for protection based on autonomy cannot include situations 
where the creator harms the autonomy interests of another.  Simply put, it does 
not make sense to recognize rights where the creative act or exercise of rights 
harms another’s autonomy.  Even if other laws may be capable of dealing with 
the problematic behavior, this fact does not imply that intellectual property 
should serve to condone that behavior.
C. The Laissez-Faire Argument
The laissez-faire argument represents a common response when people 
hear the proposition to deny rights for moral reasons.  In essence, the lais-
sez-faire argument posits that the free market should determine the value 
of intellectual works so as to avoid the government judging the morality of 
thought.  The argument thus draws from themes of free markets and free speech.
1. Argument
The laissez-faire argument holds that the government is the wrong actor 
to be making moral judgments about intellectual creations.137  The public should 
serve as the judge of whether works are permissibly moral—not the court, nor 
the legislature, nor the executive official.  Individual members of society should 
decide for themselves the moral worth of creations by their decisions whether 
to consume them.
This argument has strong intuitive appeal.  Whenever we trust the govern-
ment to make moral decisions, we yield our power to choose right from wrong 
to those who may have completely different moral values than our own, or per-
haps even different motivations that would require ignoring those values.  This 
possibility is especially dangerous in the context of intellectual property, for 
of that media”).
135. Cf. Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 1019, 1021–24 
(2019) (arguing that courts should not disguise dignity interests—such as privacy, sex-
ual autonomy, reputation, psychological and physical wellbeing—as market harms, but 
rather, courts should openly address the range of interests that they are weighing).
136. Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that privacy law does not adequately cover the 
interests at issue in revenge porn.  He argues for a moral right of disclosure in copyright 
law.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 25–36 (2020).
137. See Rothman, supra note 79, at 158–61 (arguing against judges determining copyright 
eligibility based on their own moral views).
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the decision about whether an intellectual work is sufficiently moral represents 
a decision about the morality of thought.  Therefore, when the government 
denies intellectual property because of a moral reason, the government is pass-
ing judgment on the value of a thought.  It is akin to thought police.
The democratic ideal further supports the laissez-faire argument.138 
Rather than ceding power to the government to make moral judgments about 
intellectual creations, the law should let the people decide.  In the free market, 
the public will judge whether an intellectual creation should receive protec-
tion: if the creation leads to truly harmful results, the public will not consume 
the creation.  In this way, standards of morality will impede the production of 
works only to the extent that the consuming public recognizes an absence of 
moral value in a work.  If the public does not prefer a particular moral view, 
the market will reflect that preference.  In this way, prioritizing the public’s 
choice over the government’s moral preference seems much more democrati-
cally oriented.
Closely related to this last point is the argument that government actors 
do not always make decisions that are in the best interests of their constitu-
ents.  Congress can be captured by lobbyists; judges are not accountable to the 
people; agency officials are subject to political whims of the moment.  Govern-
ment actors may reflect interests that do not give adequate consideration to 
the sensitive nature and implications of moral choices.  Moral choices include 
a variety of deeply personal and high-priority values.  For instance, inventions 
relating to abortion practices or expression that communicates racial animus 
have very different effects on members of the public, who collectively hold 
a diversity of moral values.  In the face of these sorts of moral choices and 
the diversity of moral values, government actors do not always seek to imple-
ment views that reflect those of the moral majority, or alternatively, even if 
they do, government actors do not always consider the importance of the 
moral minority.
Even assuming a trustworthy government actor who has the best 
intention of implementing moral views that will benefit society, intellectual 
property often presents moral questions that lack a straightforward answer. 
The proper subject matter of technology and expression quickly raises ques-
tions over which reasonable minds often disagree.  Consider, for instance, the 
incentive theory’s moral value in promoting the progress of science and useful 
arts under the Constitution.  Which particular values inform whether inven-
tions or expressions promote progress in science and the useful arts?  Does 
the value of preserving the environment?  Is a pollution producing automo-
bile sufficiently immoral to deny patent protection?  What about hate speech? 
138. Cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 
288, 341–64 (1996) (arguing for a conceptual framework of copyright that will enhance 
the democratic character of a civil society).
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Does hate speech promote progress?  Whose views determine whether speech 
is hateful?  These questions are not easy to answer.  Therefore, the proposal 
to apply moral judgments in defining intellectual property protection inher-
ently involves answering difficult questions that turn on subjective opinion and 
thereby inject uncertainty into the law.  Even for the most trustworthy govern-
ment actor, issues of morality may not yield a single correct resolution.  Moral 
issues generate uncertainty and subjectivity.  For this reason, the laissez-faire 
argument calls for moral decisions to lie with members of the public rather 
than the government.
2. Response
The laissez-faire argument raises points that are certainly worthy of con-
sideration.  To be sure, the government should not have complete and absolute 
discretion to determine any and all moral bases for objecting to an intellectual 
work.  For the most part, moral judgments that serve as a basis for rejecting 
an intellectual work should be exercised by individual members of the public 
in their decisions to consume or not to consume the work.  Thus, each of the 
points above supports a general presumption that the public should exercise 
its own moral discretion to determine whether an intellectual work will ulti-
mately succeed or fail in the marketplace.  Absent exceptional circumstances, 
the public will decide whether to reward or incentivize such works by their 
accepting or rejecting the creation in the free marketplace.
This presumption, however, is just that—a presumption—not an abso-
lute.  There are exceptional situations where the free market fails to produce 
efficient or just outcomes.  There are situations where the government must act. 
And in those situations, the potential problems set forth above regarding gov-
ernment officials making moral judgments should inform the principles that 
guide the moral decisionmaking process.  Not all moral decisions, nor all gov-
ernment entities, should be treated equally.  As discussed below, the laissez-faire 
argument suggests principles that should limit the government’s application of 
moral judgments.  Yet that argument does not compel the conclusion that there 
is absolutely no place for morality in the government’s decision to grant or 
deny intellectual property protection.
a. Free Speech
The first point raised in the laissez-faire argument concerns the regu-
lation of thought.  That concern merits due regard as a whole body of law 
protects individual thought from government interference: the constitutional 
right to free speech.  Whether or not the reason for government interference 
stems from a moral consideration, if the government is regulating permissible 
thought, the government could be abridging the speech right.  Hence, denying 
intellectual property protection for certain intellectual creations immediately 
raises concern under the First Amendment.
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In considering speech implications of denying intellectual property, we 
must recognize that not all regulation of intellectual creations violates free 
speech.  If regulating intellectual creations through intellectual property law 
violated free speech, there could be no requirements at all for gaining pro-
tection.  Copyright law requires expression to be original; patent law requires 
inventions to be useful, novel, and non-obvious.139  These requirements discrim-
inate based on the content of subject matter, yet presumably their long history 
in the law indicates that they do not violate the right of free speech.140  Hence, 
considerations other than simply whether a criterion discriminates against the 
content of speech must be relevant in assessing the constitutionality of a con-
tent-based criterion for intellectual property protection.  For instance, consider 
a bar to copyright protection for all expression that is created for the purpose 
of causing a criminal act.  Would that criterion necessarily violate free speech? 
Similarly, would free speech preclude the government from denying patent pro-
tection for inventions that are created for the sole purpose of harming another 
person?  It is not immediately clear that such denials of protection would nec-
essarily cross the free speech line.  Some denials clearly would; other denials 
might not.  The point is that the issue of free speech is not as one-sidedly clear 
cut as the laissez-faire counterargument might make it seem.  The issue calls for 
an analysis of speech theory and an examination of speech doctrine.  There is 
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
140. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 3–6 (1966) (recognizing pat-
ent requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness); Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Co. v.  Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (interpreting Intellectual Property Clause as re-
quiring works to manifest “original intellectual conception[]” to receive protection).  To 
illustrate this point, suppose that I repeat another’s political message.  Under principles 
of free speech, it would seem that I should receive as much speech protection as the 
original speaker.  I should be able to repeat the unoriginal political speech without any 
restriction.  Nevertheless, because copyright law imposes a requirement that expression 
be original to be copyrightable, I could not receive copyright protection for my repeat-
ed speech.  So, apparently the Copyright Clause of the Constitution justifies content 
discrimination in the recognition of copyright protection.  One might argue, however, 
that this apparent tension between free speech and copyright law is permissible because 
copyright law still allows me to disseminate the ideas in the other person’s political 
speech (without repeating that expression) as well as make a fair use of the expression 
itself.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107.  Yet that is beside the point: the speech restriction under 
consideration here is copyright’s denial of copyright protection (not the imposition of 
penalties for infringement).  Hence, the fact that I can still disseminate the idea without 
infringing, as well as repeat the expression without infringing (as a fair use) does not 
change the fact that a speech restriction is occurring—specifically, the effect on speech 
that follows from denying the economic benefit inherent in copyright protection.  See 
Snow, supra note 75.  Indeed, if the denial of protection for unoriginal expression were 
not a speech restriction, then neither would be the denial of protection for immoral 
expression.
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a weighing and balancing of interests that must occur.  Not every creation will 
raise the same speech interests.141
Thus, speech issues that follow from denying intellectual property for 
moral reasons raise complex issues.  Both speech theory and speech doctrine 
must be addressed.  As concluded in another work,142 moral restrictions on 
intellectual property eligibility may be permissible under free-speech theory 
and free-speech law depending on which intellectual property regime is under 
consideration.143  In the patent law context, free speech is consistent with broad 
discretion because moral reasons for denying protection reflect concern over 
an invention’s potential to harm society, independent of any message held by 
the inventor.  A patent denial essentially regulates conduct that incidentally 
affects speech.  In the copyright context, moral denials are permissible only if 
the reason for denial does not relate to the expression’s message.  Thus, the First 
Amendment affords Congress broad discretion for moral denials of patent pro-
tection, but only limited discretion for moral denials of copyright protection.
Putting aside the conclusions addressed above, this Article simply notes 
that the “thought police” concern is a valid one, but it does not necessarily 
imply that moral denials are absolutely inappropriate.  The theory and doctrine 
of free speech must be fully considered.  Speech theory and doctrine will dic-
tate the boundaries of denying protection.
b. Free Market
Another point in the laissez-faire argument is that the public—by its con-
sumption choices in the free market—should democratically decide the moral 
value of works rather than a government official by fiat.  To a certain extent, 
the preference for public choice of morals makes good sense.  But as an abso-
lute principle, the argument is subject to conceptual and practical flaws.  As a 
conceptual matter, a pure laissez-faire approach would require that the gov-
ernment refrain from intervening in the market for intellectual creations.  Yet 
the whole system of intellectual property constitutes government interference 
in the marketplace.  Recall from Part I that under the utilitarian theory, intel-
lectual property represents an artificial monopoly that the government creates 
to cure a market failure; in the absence of that government monopoly, the 
market will, in many instances, underproduce those works.144  The government 
is therefore intervening when it grants intellectual property protection.  This 
understanding means that the issue of whether the government should affir-
matively act to exclude a work is incorrectly framed.  Correctly framed, the 
issue is whether the government should refrain from acting to allow the free 
141. Alfred Yen provides an engaging discussion on the nuanced nature of a speech analysis 
of copyright provisions.  Alfred C. Yen, Rethinking Copyright’s Relationship to the First 
Amendment, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1215 (2020).
142. See Snow, supra note 75.
143. See id.
144. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.
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market to control the fate of a work.  Denying intellectual property protection 
does not reflect the government interfering in the marketplace.
On the other hand, if the government provides intellectual property 
rights for any intellectual creations, its decision not to provide those rights 
for other creations constitutes discriminatory intervention.  By granting pro-
tection to all works—regardless of moral character—the government is not 
favoring one over another, whereas a selective grant (against works of an 
immoral character) represents government favoring one over another.  That 
selectivity could be viewed as government intervening in a marketplace that it 
created by extending intellectual property rights.  Favoring only those works 
that the government deems to be moral would appear to offend principles of a 
laissez-faire marketplace.
However, this offense against principles of a laissez-faire marketplace 
appears justified.  Because intellectual property is itself a permissible govern-
ment intervention to cure a market failure, this fact implies that market failures 
are sufficient reason for the government to intervene.  Indeed, this is nothing 
new.  The government intervenes in a variety of markets to prevent different 
sorts of failures: environmental, financial, transportation, education, and health 
to name only a few.145  Even the marketplace of ideas is subject to government 
intervention.146  The marketplace for intellectual creations is no different.  The 
government must evaluate whether there are market failures that require it to 
intervene (by granting protection), or not to intervene (by denying protection). 
Underproduction of public goods is not the only market failure that informs 
the government’s decision on whether to intervene.  As discussed in Part I, 
the market failure of negative externalities is present where the market price 
does not accurately reflect the cost of harm that intellectual creations cause 
to third parties.147  Immoral works often harm innocent third parties.  Further-
more, asymmetric information in the marketplace is another failure that may 
affect the government’s decision to intervene.148  Sometimes consumers of an 
145. See, e.g., Len M. Nichols, Government Intervention in Health Care Markets Is Practical, 
Necessary, and Morally Sound, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 547, 550–51 (2012) (providing the 
economic justifications for state intervention within the health care market).
146. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
Rev. 964, 965 (1978) (comparing market failures in economic markets to failures in the 
marketplace of ideas); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 Duke L.J. 1, 5, 15–17 (describing the laissez-faire economic model that free-speech 
theory follows and criticizing that model for employing faulty assumptions); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common 
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Reg-
ulation, 42 B.C.  L. Rev. 1, 44 (2000) (observing that speech regulation can improve the 
functioning of the speech market to increase the aggregate amount of choice among 
competing ideas).
147. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.2.
148. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.2.
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immoral work do not realize the harm that the work causes, which translates to 
an inaccurate valuation of the work in the free marketplace.  Hence, collective 
assessment of a work may reveal more information about the work than an 
individual assessment can.  Thus, whether the discrimination against immoral 
works is termed intervention or non-intervention, it is a government decision 
that is justified.
Even assuming that the market accurately values a work and that the 
works yields a net benefit for society, the work may involve activity that soci-
ety does not desire to incentivize.  That is, the market’s preference for a work 
should not absolutely imply a public view about the morality of the work suf-
ficient to justify intellectual property protection.  Consider, for instance, a 
pornographic film of a man beating a woman, who—at the direction of the 
filmmaker—seriously injures the woman, perhaps even killing her (and she 
never consents to such harm).149  There may well be a market preference for 
this material sufficient to support its production.  Would the market’s prefer-
ence for such material imply that the beating is moral?  As discussed in Part 
I, the market success of the creation would not imply its morality under the 
labor-desert theory of intellectual property.150  Even assuming that the film-
maker pays compensatory damages to the woman, the filmmaker’s net profit 
should not imply that the making of the film, involving its inherently immoral 
act of beating, is moral.  A market demand for an intellectual creation does not 
imply individual morality of a creative act.  Commercial markets do not always 
provide a sound basis for assessing morality.
c. Untrustworthy Actors and Uncertain Answers
A final point in the laissez-faire argument is that government actors may 
be untrustworthy or ill-equipped to make moral choices that involve uncer-
tainty.151  In many instances, this is true.  Yet this fact does not compel the 
conclusion that the government should never make any moral judgments in 
149. On the issue of consent, some jurisdictions do not recognize consent in this context.  This 
assumes that any consent to the battery would not be a defense.  See, e.g., People v. Sam-
uels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (ruling that consent was not a defense 
to aggravated assault, where defendant filmed an allegedly consensual beating); see also 
id. (“[C]onsent of the victim is not generally a defense to assault or battery, except in a 
situation involving ordinary physical contact or blows incident to sports . . . .”).  For a 
detailed discussion of the approaches taken by various jurisdictions, see W.E. Shipley, 
Annotation, Consent as Defense to Charge of Criminal Assault and Battery, 58 A.L.R.3d 
662 (1974).
150. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.2.
151. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 
51, 56–57 (2010) (noting issues with legislative patent reform, including “the more po-
liticized legislative process,” “capture-prone administrative rulemaking,” and pressures 
from “divergent interest groups”); Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 
27 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 313, 314–16 (2009) (observing the influence of industry in 
forming copyright law).
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deciding a creation’s eligibility for intellectual property.  As a general matter, 
government actors have a responsibility to protect the public from harms that 
consumers are unaware of and from collective harms that individual con-
sumers do not value.152  This duty suggests that the government should deny 
intellectual property where such harms are present.  Indeed, the duty implicitly 
suggests that the government should not encourage such harms.  To that end, 
denial of intellectual property protection represents the government fulfilling 
its duty to refrain from incentivizing and rewarding conduct that is harmful 
to the public.
Nevertheless, how can we rely on government actors where they may be 
untrustworthy?  And where the matters often involve subjectivity and uncer-
tainty?  These questions are not unique to intellectual property.  The problem 
of government actors exercising discretion for a reason that is contrary to the 
views and interests of their constituents represents a problem inherent in any 
governmental regime.  Pretending that the government actors always make 
the right decisions does not solve the problem, yet neither does supporting 
harmful conduct merely because some government actors cannot be trusted. 
Instead, a democracy deals with this problem by implementing accountability 
for decisions.  Where government actors are accountable for moral judgments, 
they are more likely to act in a way that reflects the best interests of their con-
stituents.  The more accountability that government actors face for their moral 
decisions suggests that those government actors may be trusted with decisions 
that involve greater subjectivity and uncertainty, or in other words, decisions 
that call for greater discretionary judgment.  Stated differently, moral decisions 
that involve minimal discretion should lie with government actors that have 
minimal accountability, whereas moral decisions that involve great discretion 
should lie with government actors that have greater accountability.
This principle suggests that judgments involving controversial moral 
issues should lie with Congress.  Congress faces both political and constitutional 
accountability.  As a political matter, moral views that are highly controversial 
are always subject to reversal in the next election cycle; as a constitutional 
matter, the protection of fundamental rights, and in particular the freedom of 
speech, will safeguard against abuses of power.  Nevertheless, Congress should 
still be cautious in applying a moral judgment to deny protection.153  Congress 
should not deny protection unless an intellectual creation causes substan-
tial harm to society, outweighing the potential benefit.  In short, distrust of 
Congress’s motives and the inherent subjectivity in many moral issues gives 
152. See generally Steve Sheppard, I Do Solemnly Swear: The Moral Obligations of Le-
gal Officials 142–56 (2009) (articulating a government official’s duty of charity to his 
subjects).
153. Cf. Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1495, 1547–
50 (2016) (recognizing that institutions other than Congress are necessary to adopt in-
tellectual property law to technological change).
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pause to legislating moral judgments.  But that caution does not imply an abso-
lute bar.  There are exceptions to the general presumption against Congress 
denying protection for moral reasons.  Those exceptions must be weighed and 
considered cautiously.
Moral judgments that do not involve much controversy may be made 
by judges.  Judges are appointed for life and face minimal accountability for 
their views.  They should therefore decide only those moral issues in intellec-
tual property cases that admit minimal discretion.  Their moral decisions must 
be based on a straightforward instruction from Congress, a clear application of 
a constitutional directive, or if under their equitable powers, a clear principle 
that intellectual property theory demands and which can be applied with min-
imal discretionary judgment.
Similar to judges are executive officials.  The PTO and the Copyright 
Office face minimal oversight or accountability for their exercise of discre-
tion.  Although they may be replaced and are thereby subject to political 
accountability, in practice that political accountability is nonexistent.  They 
should therefore not be charged with deciding controversial moral matters in 
intellectual property.  Hence, congressional direction to the PTO or the Copy-
right Office involving a moral reason should be sufficiently specific so that the 
agency actors exercise minimal moral discretion in denying protection.
The upshot is that different government actors have different levels of 
accountability, so the moral discretion that they exercise should be defined 
accordingly.  That being said, there should be a presumption that most moral 
judgments about intellectual creations lie with the people.  Individual mem-
bers of the public should decide for themselves whether intellectual creations 
should be incentivized or rewarded.  Intellectual property protection should be 
the norm.  And for the limited category of creations that require the govern-
ment to deny protection, the different types of government actors should be 
responsible for the different types of moral judgments.
Conclusion
Questions of morality surround whether certain expressive and inventive 
creations may receive intellectual property protection.  The theories of intel-
lectual property offer valuable guidance.  Each theory implies moral values 
that dictate the boundaries of intellectual property protection.  The utilitar-
ian theory implies the specific moral value that the law should not incentivize 
works that result in a net cost to society.  Its economic rationale further sug-
gests that denying intellectual property is appropriate where the market for 
an intellectual work fails to account for a negative externality or asymmetric 
information.  The labor-desert theory is premised on the moral value that the 
law should not reward creators whose intellectual works harm the life, health, 
liberty, or property of another, or collective society generally.  The theory of 
autonomy and personality suggests the moral value that the law should not 
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recognize rights in works that inhibit another’s autonomy or exercise of per-
sonality.  Thus, these three theories provide justification for denying protection 
to certain types of intellectual works.
With respect to the three theoretical arguments against denying protec-
tion on moral grounds, this Article concludes that none of them are persuasive. 
The first is that denying protection in many instances may actually increase 
the output of the specific immoral work.  But under any of the intellectual 
property theories, a denial of protection is not supposed to control or solve a 
moral problem that is inherent in a work.  Denying protection is not intended 
to control or curbing immoral activity.  The second argument is that other laws 
should address the moral problem rather than intellectual property.  Yet intel-
lectual property should support other laws that are designed to address moral 
problems in society by not incentivizing or rewarding the very behavior that 
those other laws are attempting to control.  The third argument is that the gov-
ernment should not interfere with the laissez-faire market approach of letting 
the public decide the moral worth of an intellectual creation.  That is true in 
most situations.  This presumption, however, should not represent an absolute 
bar that would preclude Congress or courts from ever denying protection for 
moral reasons.  Within certain constitutional limitations, denial of protection 
may be appropriate even in the laissez-faire market.
Thus, theory supports denying intellectual property protection for some 
intellectual works that are immoral.  Of course, this theoretical discussion is 
only a first step in the discussion.  Additional questions regarding doctrinal 
application remain: How should the law determine which intellectual creations 
should be denied protection by the government?  How do existent legal doc-
trines comport with such denials of intellectual property protection?  These 
and many more questions may now be considered.
